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EDITORIAL

Those who read Mr. Shebbeare's article printed below with the care which it deserves will be impressed with the narrowness of the margin which, in certain respects, separates the Evangelical and the Catholic conception of the Sacraments. At bottom we suspect that the difference lies mainly in the relative place which each school gives to the Church in its method of approach. Mr. Shebbeare's approach is characteristically Evangelical in its emphasis on the standpoint of the individual. And yet, even so, he goes so far as virtually to join hands with the Catholic. "The sacramental system," he says, "is not merely 'not useless.' In relation to the life of the Church at large it may truly be called necessary." But is not that good Catholic doctrine? For surely the sacramental system always is relative to the life of the Church. Again, Mr. Shebbeare allows for the possibility that the full reception of spiritual gifts may be withheld until they can be received by the believer not simply as an individual but as a member of the *Corpus Christi*—just as the conversion of St. Paul was not completed, as the record of his psychogenic blindness shows, until he had been received into the Church by Ananias. Mr. Shebbeare's article seems to illustrate the point that the section of the Church Catechism which deals with the Sacraments would be less open to misunderstanding if it were preceded by a section on the Church.

In his discussion of the physical causality of grace in the Sacraments, Mr. Shebbeare shows himself not only a good Evangelical but a good medievalist; for St. Thomas's doctrine of physical causality was as decisively rejected by Scotus and the Franciscan tradition, and even by a later Jesuit such as Vasquez, as by Mr. Shebbeare himself. Closely connected with this issue lies another—that of what is conferred in the

Sacraments, whether grace or a title to grace; and here too Roman Catholic theologians of the scholastic and Reformation periods were divided. Even in our own day, Père Billot, until recently a Cardinal, has revived the Thomist view that what is conferred is a title to grace; while in the matter of causality, he adopts a modification of the Scotist view, and regards it as neither "physical" nor "moral," but "imperative." With this last term we are sure that Mr. Shebbeare would disagree: but at least it is clear that, on the strictest Catholic principles, there is a very wide field in the Church for legitimate disagreement. How wide it is may be seen to excellent advantage in Canon Lilley's little book *Sacraments*—the best of all introductions that we know to the theology of the Sacraments.

We are glad to be able to print this month the text of the interesting sermon by the Bishop of Birmingham, which was reported in *The Times* of March 3. Our readers will, of course, remember that it is a sermon, and that therefore, as the Bishop points out to us in a covering letter, the scientific evidence is inevitably much contracted and some opinions stated without argument. That does not, however, impair the importance of the Bishop's testimony, coming as it does from one whose "chief intellectual interest . . . is the study of the relations between science and religion," to the nature and birth of the soul. The Bishop would probably demur to the phrase we should naturally have used in this connexion—"the supernatural birth of the soul": but there seems no reason to quarrel about terms, if there is agreement about the ideas behind them. And when the Bishop writes that "there appeared, when the human soul began, a new quality of being witnessed to by man's moral consciousness"; that that quality is "fundamentally independent of the organized matter needed for its manifestation"; and that man is decisively separated from all other animals," he is saying something which commands a very wide concurrence among modern theologians. When we pass, on the other hand, from the soul's nature to its destiny, we are less able to follow the Bishop. The doctrine of the immortality of the soul has, of course, weighty authority in Christian theology from the days of the Alexandrian Fathers onwards; and the denial of it was officially condemned by a Bull of Pope Leo X. in 1513. For our own part, however, we believe that the alternative doctrine of Conditional Immortality has far greater claims to belief, whether regard be had to the teaching of the New Testament or to the experience of the moral consciousness. But that is a large question and cannot be dealt with here. We shall hope to return to it in an article at an early date.

Mr. McKerrow's article is characteristic of a movement of criticism which is to be discerned in many quarters today, and is all the more effective in that it is an individual expression of opinion and does not reflect the theological standpoint of this journal. Mr. Lippmann's A *Preface to Morals*, and still more Mr. Montgomerie Belgion's *Our Present Philosophy of Life* (to be reviewed in our next issue), are symptomatic of the modern world's tendency to become thoroughly tired of its own modernity in the matter of ethics. As the history of Epicureanism shows, that is the common fate of hedonism: it provokes its own reaction. Mr. McKerrow takes up similar cudgels in the field of religion; and shows that at any rate Mr. Russell's arguments against religion are not of much substance. It is of little avail to criticize Christian theism if all that is offered in its place is a return to idols.

ISRAEL AND MOAB—I

THE question has been proposed, although not answered, by Wellhausen:* "Why the history of Israel, from an approximately similar beginning, led to a quite different result from that of Moab." Opinions may vary as to what is the true answer to this problem; but the question itself brings into light the fact, abundantly proved by the Mesha stone and other sources, that for a considerable period the language, religious ideas and practices, civilization, and culture of Moab were on quite as high a level as those of Israel. This would seem to involve racial affinity of the two peoples, arising from identity of origin and a common history. This view invites us to examine the early traditions of Israel to see what light on the subject is to be obtained from them. In these traditions, as hardly needs to be said, racial history has to be deduced from stories about individuals.

We find, then, that Lot was the son of Haran, the brother of Abram (Gen. xi. 27, 31). Here it is a fact to be noticed that this name reappears in that of the Moabite city Beth Haran† (Num. xxxii. 36). When Abram made his great migration from Charran Lot went with him (Gen. xii. 4). In Palestine the two agreed to separate, and Lot chose to dwell in the *Kikkar* of the Jordan, living in the city of Sodom (Gen. xiii. 11, 12). The district named seems to have meant‡ the basin consisting of the lower and broader part of the Jordan valley beginning about twenty-five miles north of the Dead Sea, and including apparently the Dead Sea itself and the small plain at its south end (Deut. xxxiv. 3). When Lot escaped from the catastrophe of the Cities of the Plain he lived in Zoar,§ at the south-east corner of the Dead Sea (Gen. xix. 22), and afterwards removed to the mountains, which were later Moabite. Here he lived in a cave, where is placed the unpleasing story about his daughters (Gen. xix. 30-38).

Endeavouring to deduce the facts which lie behind these legends, we seem to discern a wave of Aramean immigration, bringing the Israelite and related peoples—Moab, Ammon, and (later) Edom—from Mesopotamia into their future settlements (Deut. xxvi. 5).‖ Abram was the ancestor of the "Hebrews," —a wider term than "Israel"‖—and Lot is not yet separated

* Gesch. v., p. 36. † Dillmann, Gen. vi., p. 213.

‡ Driver, Gen., p. 152.

§ As to the site of Zoar, see Dillmann, *u.s.*, p. 273; Driver, *u.s.*, pp. 170, 201. Quæ usque nunc ostenditur. Lagarde, Onom. 181.

‖ Cam. Anc. Hist. i. 193; ii. 352.

from him. A separation of the immigrant company took place in South Palestine, and the tribe known as Lot moved into the *Kikkar*. As in the analogous case of Esau (Gen. xxxvi. 6), this movement was of great historical importance. The Lot tribes gave up any claims to the possession of Canaan, and the future territorial relations between them and Israel were foreshadowed.* Later, driven from their settlements by some great natural catastrophe—perhaps a volcanic eruption†—the Lot tribe moved to Zoar and then to the mountain, where they became *troglodytes* —cave-dwellers. They probably adopted this mode of life from their near neighbours, the Chorites, who at that time occupied the territory which later was Edom‡ (Deut. ii. 12). In the list of Chorite tribes (Gen. xxxvi. 20) we find the name *Lotan*, the similarity of which to *Lot* is very striking, and it is extremely likely that this indigenous Chorite tribe became incorporated with the immigrant tribe of Lot, adding greatly to its strength and importance.§ At what period and under what historical circumstances the Lot tribe was divided into the two tribes of Moab and Ammon we have no means of knowledge. The unpleasing story, with its strange etymologies, arose from Israelite hatred of these nations, and perhaps in better minds from dislike of their immoral ways (Num. xxv. 1-3). The tale was a coarse jest levelled against these hated adversaries.‖

It was long before the two races of Israel and Moab, once so closely connected, again came in contact with one another. In the intervening period the Moabites had gained a settlement by conquering the Emim, a Canaanite race of gigantic stature—also called Rephaim (Deut. ii. 10-12). It has been conjectured¶ that these Emim or Rephaim were connected in legend with the paleolithic monuments in which Moab is so rich, and which were regarded as giants' graves. In that strange story of the five confederate Eastern Kings, behind which we are convinced some historical reality lies,** the conquerors are said (Gen. xiv. 5) to have smitten the Emim in Shaveh (*i.e.*, the plain of) Kiriathaim, which is probably Kerioth (Num. xxxii. 37; Jer. xlviii. 23), north of the Arnon, and afterwards included in Moab.††

The Moabite territory in its full extent reached to the Jabbok (Judg. xi. 13, 22), but (shortly, it would seem, before the arrival of Israel) they had suffered a severe blow from the Amorites.

* Dillmann, *u.s.*, 229. † Ewald, Gesch. ii.; E.T. i. 313-314.
‡ Cannon, "Israel and Edom," THEOLOGY, September, 1927, p. 131.
§ Ewald, *op. cit.*, p. 313; Cam. Anc. Hist. i. 235.
‖ Dillmann, Gen. vi., p. 277. ¶ Kittel, Gesch. i. 5, 6, p. 37.
** See Budge, Babylonia, p. 37; Dillmann, Gen., p. 235; Maspero, Hist. Anc. ii. 47, n. 5. Gadd. Hist. and Mon. of Ur. 165, 177-9.
†† Mesha, ll. 10, 13: Nunc autem . . . juxta Medabam urbem Arabiæ et adpellatur Coraitha in decimo miliario supra dictæ urbis contra occidentalem plagam. Lagarde, Onom. 142, 270.

This blonde race was in early times frequently mentioned by the name *Amurru* in Egyptian and Babylonian records. In O.T. sources they are generally spoken of as "dwelling in the mountains"—Highlanders.* The Israelites found them on the east of the Jordan, and the mountainous country of Palestine was largely in their hands.† The Eastern Kings, advancing from Kadesh, smote the Amorites on the south-west of the Dead Sea‡ (Gen. xiv. 7). Jacob is said to have taken Shechem from them by military force (Gen. xlviii. 22). The Gibeonites represented to Joshua that they were about to be invaded by "all the kings of the Amorites dwelling in the mountain" (Josh. x. 6). They seem to have been at one time near Petra§ (Judg. i. 36). The Israelites had already been engaged with the Amorites and their neighbours in the Arabah, and suffered a defeat at their hands (Deut. i. 7, 9, 44). These fierce Highlanders, under their King Sihon, had driven Moab back from the Jabbok to the Arnon, and occupied the intervening territory, and Israel found that the then northerly boundary between Moab and the Amorites was the Arnon (Num. xxi. 13-15, 26; Judg. xi. 18; Deut. ii. 30). Such was the reduced Moab towards which the Israelites journeyed as they circled round Edom (Num. xxi. 14-18; Judg. xi. 18; Deut. ii. 8). We find Israel at the Wady Zered (Num. xxi. 12; Deut. ii. 13), the position of which is not quite certain, but which is generally considered to be one of the upper waters or tributaries of the Arnon,‖ the phrase following "from there they journeyed and encamped beyond (*i.e.*, to the south of) Arnon, which is in the wilderness," indicating some locality outside the boundary of Moab. Another source states that Israel requested leave to pass through Moab (as in the case of Edom), which is far from unlikely, and that this being refused, they went in the wilderness and encircled the land of Moab, but did not cross the boundary (Judg. xi. 18). They must have travelled somewhat in the line of the present *Haj* road¶—the route in Num. xxvii. 18 from Mattan to Pisgah could not have been travelled *at this time.*** It was not open till after the conquest of Heshbon. To prove and illustrate this journey a fragment of a poem†† is quoted from "the book of Jahweh's wars":

* Kittel, *op. cit.*, p. 21. † Sayce, Higher Crit., p. 355.

‡ Dillmann, Gen. 242; Driver, Gen. 162.

§ See as to the text, Klosterman, Gesch., p. 132.

‖ See G. A. Smith, Hist. Geog. 557; Gray, Num., p. 284 and map; Binns, Num., p. 241. ¶ See Cam. Anc. Hist. iii. 336; Conder, Palestine, Map VII.

** Gray, *u.s.*, p. 194.

†† At the beginning we supply in thought עברנו (Deut. ii. 14), וחב בסופה is very difficult. LXX read *τὴν Ζωὸβ ἐφλόγισεν.* It has been conjectured that the first name is דיזהב (Deut. i. 1) (Binns), and סופה has been connected with סוף in the same verse (Driver, Deut., p. 3). The Lat. *sicut fecit in Mare rubro* was followed by A.V. Some unknown sites on the Moabite border are indicated.

(We traversed) Vaheb in Suphah,
And the Wadies (which are) Arnon,
And the cliff of the Wadies
Which inclines towards the site of Ar,
And leans on the border of Moab.
(Num. xxi. 14, 15.)

We do not know at what date the book of Jahveh's wars was compiled, but we can have little doubt that this poem was contemporary. The detailed topography is enough to show this. Ar or Ar Moab (Num. xxi. 28; Deut. ii. 9, 18, 29; Isa. xv. 1) is a city whose exact position is uncertain, but it must have been in the north-east corner of Moab, near the route which the Israelites were traversing.*

About this time came the request to Sihon, the Amorite King, for a peaceable passage through his country and the subsequent war with him (Num. xxi. 21-27; Deut. ii. 26-37; Judg. xi. 19-22). In this war the decisive battle took place at Jahaz (or Jahzah, Jer. xlviii. 21), not far north of the Arnon and close to the desert (Kedemoth).† This was followed by the capture of the royal seat of Heshbon, with other cities. It is somewhat surprising that the tribes of Israel, as yet almost untried in warfare, should have achieved the conquest of this territory, but we are far from supposing that it was accomplished by one stroke or at one time. We must think of it in the same way as the conquest of Western Canaan is described in Judg. i.—*i.e.*, as a gradual conquest city by city (as Jazer, Num. xxi. 32) rather than as a sudden and complete occupation of the whole of the country.‡ The picture in Num. xxxii. of Reuben and Gad as being able to leave their families and cattle in these lands in full security while the men went forth to the conquest of Western Palestine is quite ideal, and cannot correspond with the facts. They must have lived in a perpetual struggle with the Moabites, seeking to recover their old territory. And this is enough to account for the fact that in the Song of Deborah (Judg. v. 15 *f.*) both these tribes are rebuked for failing to join the national confederacy.§ They both had enough to contend with at home.

There has been preserved to us a song of this period which the ballad-singers‖ of Israel used to sing with reference to the calamity of Moab and the defeat of Sihon. Difficult as it is to

* Driver, Deut., p. 40. *Ar* locus vel oppidum Arnonis. Lag., Onom. 122. See G. A. Smith, *u.s.*, 559.

† Driver, Deut., p. 40; Gray, Num. 296; Mesha, ll. 18-20: usque hodie ostenditur inter Medabam et Debus. Lag., Onom. 163, 267.

‡ Gray, *u.s.*, 298.

§ See Kittel, Gesch. ii. 2, p. 67.

‖ *Moshelim*, minstrels who sang or recited *mashals*. See Gray, Num., Addend a p. xiii.

interpret, it was evidently felt by the editor of Numbers to confirm and illustrate his story:*

27. Come to Heshbon.
Let the city of Sihon be built and established.
28. For fire went out from Heshbon,
A flame from the city of Sihon.
It devoured Ar Moab;
It swallowed up the heights of Arnon.
29. Woe to thee, Moab!
Thou art perished, people of Chemosh.
He made his sons fugitives,
And his daughters captives
To an Amorite King, Sihon.
30. And their posterity perished:
Heshbon to Dibon,
But *we* devastated even to Nophach.
Fire to Medaba!

(Num. xxi. 27-30.)

Ever since Ewald† it has been largely held that this song has a satirical or an ironical intention, and that this is the key to its interpretation. The satire seems to be levelled, not against the Moabites, with whom as yet Israel had no quarrel, but against the Amorites. There is, in fact, rather a note of pity for the calamities Moab has suffered. Looking at the song from this point of view, we note that verses 27 and 28 are an ironical invitation to the conquered Amorites to rebuild Heshbon, after the capture of which by Sihon Ar Moab and other places had felt the devouring flame of Amorite invasion. "Come back," says the poet, "and build it now"!

Verse 29 describes in feeling terms the sufferings experienced by Moab at the hands of the victorious Amorites, whose ravages extended south of the Arnon.

Verse 30 is very difficult and broken, and something seems to have dropped out. The first two lines carry on the description of the sufferings of Moab; the rest of the verse, by a sudden transition, is the triumphant cry of Israel as to the way in which they in their turn had carried devastation into the realm of

* Verse 28, בעלי. This is hardly intelligible. LXX has καὶ κατέπιε, which would =וַתִּבְלַע (Num. xvi. 32), Binns, which we adopt.

Verse 30: ונירם is harsh and unsuitable. LXX has καὶ τὸ σπέρμα αὐτῶν = וְזַרְעָם, which is generally accepted (Ges. K. 76 *f*., Gray, Binns). The only difficulty is that in every other place נין is coupled with נכד, but in spite of this we think this reading should be adopted.

אשר. The ר is *nekud* both in K'tib and K'ri, so that the reading is אֵשׁ. LXX is confused, but supports this.

The quotation of verses 28-29 in Jer. xlviii. 45-46 seems to be from memory, and is too loose to be of much value for criticism of the text. These verses are not found in the LXX of Jeremiah.

† Ewald, Gesch., E.T. ii. 206; Gray, Num. 300.

these savage conquerors. So the poem begins and ends with the ruin of Amorite dominion north of the Arnon.

It has, however, been suggested* that this song is of much later date—of the time of Omri—that Sihon was really a Moabite King who resided in Heshbon, which was a Moabite city (Isa. xv. 4, xvi. 8; Jer. xlviii. 45), and the victory of Israel here described belongs to the ninth century. There is really nothing to support this view. Heshbon and the territory between the Arnon and the Jabbok were always part of Moab after the conquest of the Emim, but they suffered many changes of mastery. The *Amorite* conquest was followed by an *Israelite* conquest, and by the settlement in this territory of the tribes of Reuben and Gad (Num. xxxii. 33; Deut. iii. 12; Josh. xii. 9), as Meyer agrees. Finally, in the days of Ahaziah it was reconquered by Mesha and was *Moabite* again, and was so in the times of the prophets.† But it was Moab all the time. Galicia did not cease to be Poland because Austria held it for 150 years. We are further told that the Reubenites rebuilt Heshbon (Num. xxxii. 37), thus actually doing what the song ironically challenges the Amorites to perform.

When the tribes of Israel after these victories were assembled in the plains of Moab to cross the Jordan, Balak, King of Moab, was, not unnaturally, afraid of them. In the old song of triumph over the discomfiture of the Egyptians (which in its present complete form may be dated as written in the first times of the settlement in Canaan,‡ but which certainly embodies elements dating from the Exodus), a tradition is preserved that not only the Philistines and the clan-chiefs of Edom, but the bell-wethers or princes of Moab, were filled with terror at these great events (Exod. xv. 15). This story would not be forgotten when the Israelite tribes actually appeared. The apprehensions of Balak (Num. xxii. 2-4) are of great interest, since they introduce us to the story of Bileam b. Beor (Balaam), "one of the most puzzling and at the same time one of the most striking in the whole of the O.T."§ It is out of the question to discuss here all aspects of this story—it would require a volume. We must confine ourselves to considering some points which seem most necessary to our purpose.

(*a*) We see no reason to doubt that we are dealing here with actual historical circumstances so far as relates to the narrative of Num. xxii. to xxiv. The King of Moab may have been willing enough to see Israel attack the Amorites, but he could not have regarded with indifference their permanent settlement in

* Meyer, Die Israeliten und Ihre Nachbarstämmen, p. 530.
† Kittel, Gesch. i. 5 and 6, pp. 333, 378.
‡ *Ibid.*, p. 325, n. 1; Dillmann, E.L. iii. p. 169.
§ Binns, *u.s.*, 149.

his old territory. Balak as King of Moab and Bileam were known to later Hebrew tradition (Josh. xxiv. 9; Judg. xi. 25; Mic. vi. 5), and the picture of both in this story is thoroughly lifelike. The difficulties which it undoubtedly presents are simply due to the fact that the narrative as well as the poems are derived from two different sources—J and E—which have been fused together without any regard to inconsistencies, which are patent enough. Thus in Num. xxii. 5 one account places Bileam's home on the Euphrates, the other in Ammon.* In xxii. 30 Bileam, having received God's permission to go, travels with the princes of Moab. In verse 21 he travels with two servants and without the permission of Jahveh. The elders of Midian (xxii. 4-7) are introduced without apparent reason, and are not again mentioned. The existence of these and other discrepancies, however, does not affect the fact that both sources agree as to the main outlines of the story, and we may be satisfied that we are dealing with real people and actual happenings.

(*b*) Were the four poems contained in this section written at the same times and by the same writers as the composite narratives which were welded into the story, or are they only illustrations of the story? The three poems in Num. xxi. are introduced by formulæ which suggest that they were inserted by way of illustration, and one of them (xxi. 14) is quoted from another book. But the case seems to be different here. In the Bileam narrative the oracles are not merely illustrations of the story; they are actually parts of it. The editors of E (*cir.* 850) and J. (*cir.* 800), as they collected the events of the past from written or oral tradition,† in all probability found the poems told in the course of the story as we have them now. Their dates will be considered when the texts are examined in detail.

(*c*) We have discussed in another place‡ the supposed identity of Bileam with Bela ben Beor, a King of Edom (Gen. xxxvi. 32), and we arrived at the conclusion that this identity cannot be maintained, but that Bileam was probably an Edomite seer. As such he must have been of great influence and reputation. The statements that Balak sent for him from some distance, that the deputation was of high rank and carried presents, that Balak went to the boundary of his country to meet him and implicitly obeyed his directions, show that in the opinion of the narrator the blessings or curses of this foreigner were effectual and had results. It is even more perplexing that in

* See Lat. super flumen terræ filiorum Ammon; and Syr. Sayce, Higher Crit. 275, takes a different view, thinking that Ammo is a god.

† Kittel, *u.s.*, 322, 343.

‡ Cannon, "Israel and Edom," THEOLOGY, September, 1927, pp. 133-134.

this tradition Jahveh speaks through Bileam, and that the latter uses the name of Jahveh thirteen times, once actually saying, "Jahveh, my God" (xxii. 18). The narrator cannot have supposed that Jahveh was honoured in Edom, although at a later time we find a temple of Jahveh in Moab.* We can only conclude with Gray† that to the writer's mind the God of Israel revealed Himself outside the limits of the chosen people and made Bileam the instrument to effect His purposes.

(*d*) The story of Bileam is of great value in enabling us to form some judgment about the methods of *Nabiism*, or the more primitive forms of prophecy in early Israel. It is surprising how meagre is our information on this subject. We have, indeed, the very valuable record (Num. xi. 22-29), according to which the spirit of Jahveh rested on seventy elders and also on Eldad and Medad, and they were prophesying‡ in the camp; but we are not told in what way the prophetic ecstasy manifested itself. We find nothing else on the subject until we read in the history of Saul (1 Sam. x. 11-13) how he met a group of *Nabiim*, and the spirit of God rushed upon him, and he began prophesying† among them. On a subsequent occasion, with more detail (1 Sam. xix. 19 *f.*), we see the group of *Nabiim* with Samuel standing as a leader over them. Embassies from Saul were seized by prophetic ecstasy, and they too prophesied,§ and, infected by the same ecstasy, he too began to prophesy,‖ and rushed along with these men, in wild excitement stripped off his mantle (Isa. xx. 2; Mic. i. 8),¶ and, utterly exhausted, fell down and lay prone for a day and a night. Now what one would wish to know is how such wild dervishes developed men like Samuel or Elijah. Perhaps the story of Bileam offers some help in filling this blank place. For although he was not an Israelite, his story comes to us through Israelite tradition and Israelite narrators. He believes that God speaks through him (xxii. 8, 13, 19; xxiii. 5, 12, 25; xxiv. 13). There is something objective in the Divine message. An overpowering spirit compels the man to absolute obedience, and he can speak only his message.** But he has also to take certain means in order to obtain the spiritual impulse he needs, and they are very different from the wild orgies of raving dervishes. He must be on a mountain height. He must see the people who are to be the subject of his oracle. Altars†† must be built and victims offered, and apparently some forms of divination or incantation were sometimes used (xxiv. 1). Then the prophet stands in silence and solitude to receive the Divine message, or throws himself on the

* Mesha, ll. 14-18.
† Gray, Num. 317.
‡ מתנבאים. § יתנבא. ‖ יתנבאו. ¶ Driver, Sam. 125.
** See Cam. Anc. Hist. iii. 459.
†† Perhaps *dolmens*. Conder, Palestine, 157.

ground, looking up with open eyes. But as has been well said, these artificial means are not to be confused with the abnormal or ecstatic experiences which may have led up to the prophecy.* We cannot fail to see in this much earlier period many of the traits of Elijah—the high mountain, the altar, the sacrifice, an articulate message—and, it may be added, the conviction that the man inspired by God may view with indifference what Kings may think about his utterances. Bileam must be regarded as a Seer (ראה) rather than a *Nabi* (1 Sam. ix. 9-11), and from his example we may reasonably conclude that long before Samuel there were in Israel also higher forms of prophecy than the frantic actions of the Nabiim.

(*e*) We are not able to attach any credit to the statements in P (Num. xxxi. 8; Josh. xiii. 22) that Bileam, son of Beor, "the enchanter," was slain fighting for the Midianites against Israel, and that his advice had led to the sin of Baal-Peor (Num. xxxi. 16). This story is quite inconsistent with the conduct ascribed to him in the earlier narrative. But, indeed, the whole story of this Midianite war is very late, and though it may contain some traditional elements, cannot be considered to be history; it is rather an ideal picture of the manner in which a sacred war must have been conducted by Israel.†

We now turn to the poetical oracles.

FIRST ORACLE‡ (Num. xxiii. 7-10).

7. From Edom Balak is bringing me
   A King of Moab, from mountains of the East
   (saying), Come, curse me, Jacob;
   And, Come, imprecate me, Israel.
8. How shall I curse whom God hath not cursed ?
   And how shall I imprecate whom Jahveh hath not imprecated ?
9. For from rocky summits I see him,
   And from hills I view him.
   Lo ! a people that dwell alone
   And does not reckon itself among the nations.

* Cam. Anc. Hist., *u.s.*

† See Driver, Introd. i., p. 64; Peake's Com. 225. The N.T. references to Balaam (2 Pet. ii. 15; Jude 11) are based on this late authority.

‡ Verse 7: for ארם read אֲרֹם. Cannon, *u.s.*, p. 133. In the third line we must supply in thought לאמור.

זעמה. This root usually expresses "rage, fury," but the meaning "curse" is assured by Prov. xxiv. 24; Mic. vi. 10. LXX ἄραται and ἐπικατάρασαι. Lat. *detestare* and parallelism confirm this meaning.

Verse 10: ומספר. LXX has καὶ τίς ἐξαριθμήσεται. Lat. *quis . . . possit . . . nosse numerum*. We read (Gray) וּמִי סָפַר.

את־רבע. LXX δήμους. Lat. *stirpes*. Read רִבְבוֹת (Num. x. 30, Binns, Gray), supported by parallelism.

אחריתי. This word might mean "posterity." LXX τὸ σπέρμα μου (so Binns). But here it seems to mean "closing days" (Job viii. 7; xlii. 12; so Gray). Lat. *novissima mea*.

10. Who ever counted the dust of Jacob ?
And who ever numbered the myriads of Israel ?
May my soul die the death of the righteous,
And may my last days be like his !

This poem is in complete agreement with the surrounding narrative. It contains the feelings inspired in the Seer's mind as he gazed on Israel from the mountain tops. It contains no allusion to later circumstances or events. We have no hesitation in pronouncing it to be part of the original text of E, and it may be much older. Quite possibly it may be contemporary with the events to which it alludes.

SECOND ORACLE* (Num. xxiii. 18-24).

18. Up, Balak, and hear;
Give ear to me, son of Sippor.
19. God is not man that He should lie,
Nor a son of man that He should repent.
Hath He said and will not perform ?
Hath He spoken and will not establish it ?
20. Behold ! to bless I received (command),
And I will bless and not reverse it.
21. I do not behold sorrow in Jacob,
I do not observe calamity in Israel.
Jahveh his God is with him,
And a royal shout is in his midst.
22. God is bringing him out of Egypt.
He has (strength) like the strength of a wild ox.
23. For there is no enchantment in Jacob,
And no divination in Israel.
Now it may be said about Jacob and Israel:
" What hath God wrought ?"
24. Behold, a people who rises up like a lioness,
And lifts himself up like a lion.
He will not lie down till he eat prey
And drink the blood of the slain.

This poem, in its present form, is composite, verses 22 and 23 being ascribed to J., but we fail to see any difference of conception in the component parts; verses 21, 22, and 23 express the same thought, the present prosperity of Israel; verses 21 and 23 use "Jacob" and " Israel " in precisely the same way. In neither

* Verse 20: וברך. LXX has *εὐλογήσω*, and this agrees with the first person in the following word. Read וַאֲבָרֵךְ.

Verse 21: ראה ... הביט. Syr has both words in first person. This seems better as a reason for the previous declaration. Read אֶרְאֶה־אַבִּיט.

עמל ... און. LXX *μόχθος ... πόνος*. These words do not connote moral delinquency, but disaster or calamity.

תרועת. LXX *τὰ ἔνδοξα ἀρχόντων*, apparently reading תִּפְאֶרֶת, which has been proposed. But the text is better. The speaker can *hear* the sounds of the camp.

part is there any allusion to a future time. Verse 21 does not refer to the existence of a King of Israel. The word *Melek* is appellative. "Such a shout as triumphant Kings hear." There is no real prediction. The keynote is "Now" (verse 23). Whatever may be the literary history of this poem, both its parts have the same qualities as Oracle I. It arises from a renewed view of Israel from mountain summits. It is in agreement with the surrounding narrative, and may be much older. Like Oracle I., it may be contemporary with what is described.

THIRD ORACLE* (Num. xxiv. 4-9).

4. Oracle of Bileam, son of Beor,
   And oracle of the man of clear vision;
   Oracle of him who hears the words of God,
   Who sees the vision of Shaddai
   Falling down, but with opened eyes.
5. How fair are thy tents, O Jacob!
   Thy dwellings, O Israel!
6. As valleys they are spread forth,
   As gardens by a river,
   As aloes which Jah has planted,
   As cedars beside the waters.
7. Water shall flow from his bucket,
   And his seed shall be in many waters,
   And his King shall be higher than Agag,
   And his kingdom shall be exalted.
8. God is bringing him out of Egypt.
   He has (strength) like the strength of a wild ox.
   He shall eat up the nations his adversaries,
   And shatter their loins.
9. He couched, he lay down like a lion,
   And like a lioness—who will stir him up?
   [Every one that blesses thee is blest,
   And everyone that curses thee accursed.

This oracle, like the two first, is in the main suitable to the time and the circumstances, but for one remarkable passage (verse 7), speaking of a King, a Kingdom, and Agag. We cannot

* Verse 4: שתם העין. In this much-debated phrase LXX has ὁ ἀληθινῶς ὁρῶν, Syr דנליעינא. These versions obviously understood a *seeing*, not a *closed* eye, as in the fifth line. Wellhausen (Comp. iii. 351) proposed שְׁתָם הָעַיִן out of the same letters, which in default of anything better we adopt.

נפל. We take this word to mean physical prostration through overpowering emotion (1 Sam. xix. 24).

Verse 7: The first two lines have been much discussed (Gray, 364-365). We think they express the feeling that Israel would shortly enter a well-watered country (Deut. viii. 7). Read with Lat. דָּלְיוֹ.

Verse 8: The first distich is exactly repeated from xxiii. 22, וחציו. Syr has חציהוי = חֲלָצָיו (Isa. v. 27), which we adopt.

Verse 9: The first distich is identical with Gen. xlix. 9, substituting שכב for רבץ.

doubt that this alludes to the events narrated in 1 Sam. xv., and marks one of the few really successful events of Saul's career. This fixes its date within narrow limits. In David's later time this victory over a company of marauding Bedawin (1 Sam. xiv. 48)* would hardly have called forth a comparison with such a paltry King. We should date this passage in the end of Saul's or the beginning of David's reign.† On the other hand, the bulk of this poem seems to be of the same character as the first and second. The only conclusion at which the writer can arrive is that the distich about the Kingship and perhaps the quotation from Gen. xlix. 9 were later insertions into the original poem.

FOURTH ORACLE‡ (Num. xxiv. 15-17).

15. Oracle of Bileam, son of Beor,
    And oracle of the man of clear vision;
16. Oracle of him who hears the words of God,
    And knows the knowledge of the Most High,
    Who sees the vision of Shaddai
    Falling down, but with opened eyes.
17. I see him, but not now;
    I behold him, but not near.
    A star has arisen out of Jacob,
    And a sceptre has arisen out of Israel,
    And smites the temples of Moab
    And the scalp of the sons of Sheth.

This poem is generally considered to end with verse 17, and we think this is right. The Seer offers unasked a prediction of the future relations of Israel and Moab (verse 14). Here he utters it, and his mission is finished. Verses 15 and 16 are almost the same as verse 4 of the third oracle. In verse 17 all allusion to Moab ends, and the remaining verses are isolated oracles of later date and uncertain meaning. This fourth oracle seems to be of the same period as the first three (note "Jacob" and "Israel"). Like them it is very old, and possibly contemporary.

Bileam returned home apparently without any reward (Num. xxii. 18; xxiv. 11). But a worse danger awaited Israel. While encamped at Shittim (Josh. ii. 1; iii. 1), waiting to cross the Jordan, they yielded to the attractions of the licentious

* See Meyer, *op. cit.*, 324, n. 1, 391. † Kittel, Gesch. ii. 2, p. 255, n. 1.

‡ Verse 17: דרך. LXX has *ἀνατελεῖ*. Lat. *orietur*. Read זרח (Well., Gray, Binns). See as to the tense Dri. Ten. 14*a*. כאתי. The meaning is very uncertain. LXX has *ἀρχηγοὺς*. Lat. *duces*. Gray and Binns render "temples" of the head (Lev. xix. 27), which we adopt with doubt.

וקרקר כל־בני־שת. In Jer. xlviii. 45 this is read וְקַרְקַר פְּאַת בְּנֵי שָׁאוֹן. קרקר is obviously right. As to שת Meyer (*op. cit.*, 219, n. 1) thinks, in view of the parallelism, that this is the name of a Moabite tribe. Cook (Cam. Anc. Hist. ii. 369) suggests the Sutu Bedawin, who are mentioned with the Habiru. Well. and Gray read שְׁאֵת, Binns שָׁאוֹן. All the versions read שֵׁת, and we think this is the true text.

worship of the Baal of Peor* (Num. xxiii. 28). The simple semi-nomadic tribes from the desert felt the same delight in this Baal or nature worship, which perhaps they knew for the first time, as their descendants always did (Hos. ix. 10); and a general slaughter of the adherents of this Moabite worship was ordered as the only remedy (Num. xxv. 5; Deut. iv. 3-4).

When Israel marched away from Moab the tribes of Reuben and Gad were left in occupation of the conquered territory, and are said to have rebuilt fourteen towns between the Jabbok and the Arnon (Num. xxxii. 33-36). The story of P (Josh. xiii. 15-38) allots to Reuben all the territory conquered from Sihon, assigning to Gad a territory further north. This is by no means the view of Numbers, where the cities of these tribes are intermixed. The towns ascribed to Reuben form a group in the territory, for the most northerly named (Jogbehah and Jazer), and the most southerly (Aroer and Dibon, or Dibon-Gad [Num. xxxiii. 45]) are Gadite.† This view is less symmetrical than the ideal representation in P, but is no doubt a truer view of what actually happened.‡ So these tribes were left to contend as well as they might with Moab and other neighbours, to whom Reuben ultimately succumbed. In the time of Deborah (Judg. v. 15) and as described in the "Blessing of Jacob" (Gen. xlix. 3) the tribe still had an important political existence. But in the "Blessing of Moses" (Deut. xxxiii. 7):

> May Reuben live, and not die,
> And may he have a few men!

he is obviously regarded as on the verge of entire extinction, and Mesha does not even mention him.§

W. W. CANNON.

* See G. A. Smith, Hist. Geog. 566, n. 1; Driver, Deut. 63.

† Gray, *u.s.*, 434; Peake's Com. 229. In 1 Chron. v. 8 Aroer, Nebo, and Baal Meon are mentioned as Reubenite.

‡ See Cam. Anc. Hist. ii. 366.

§ Meyer, *op. cit.*, 532; G. A. Smith, *op. cit.*, 567; Kittel, Gesch. ii. 2, p. 67. The oracle (xlix. 3) must be earlier than Mesha. Kittel dates it in the reign of Saul (1 Sam. xiv. 47).

(To be concluded.)

CONTRA CELSUM

MR. BERTRAND RUSSELL approves of being as sceptical as possible. But why is it a merit in him to reduce his scientific beliefs to a minimum while a modernist theologian may not reduce *his* scientific beliefs without being accused of intellectual dishonesty? May we not "believe in God"—in some sense—unless we believe in the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob? May we not "believe in the risen Christ"—in some sense—unless we believe in the bodily resurrection? In salvation and damnation, unless we believe in Heaven and Hell?

"In some sense"—is *there* the rub? But we fancy that Mr. Russell believes in his self in no other way than that. He certainly does not believe in his self in the sense that a plain man does, and of the various senses in which he has believed in himself, none of them has been both wholly intelligible and wholly acceptable to anyone, including Mr. Russell himself. Why, then, if our heart prompts us to believe in God, should we wait on our heads for permission?

Because, says Mr. Russell, with Lucretius, religion is "a disease born of fear" and "a source of untold misery to the human race."* But this is merely a rationalization of Mr. Russell's confession of faith. He merely tells us here that *his* heart has *not* prompted him to believe in God—which is interesting as a personal confession, but not relevant to the question in hand.

Let us grant the whole rationalist case, and suppose that the Gospel story is entirely mythical. Is not "mythology" in these days something very different from old wives' fables? Do scientists not assure us that their so-called knowledge is, in short, mythology? A form of symbols, the most convenient arrangement of convenient fictions? There is no sting left in the word "mythical." It merely admits the inadequacy of our heads, the mysteriousness of the fact. Athanasius does this very handsomely.

Mr. Russell, who has only his very capable head, fails to distinguish between the *mere* myth, so to speak, and the fact inextricably involved in it, and throws all overboard together. His analytic genius has failed him—the kingdom of God cometh not with observation.

The important fact is that the myth of Christ, if it *be entirely* a myth, should ever have arisen. The myth theory explains away Christ, but how explain away the myth? Do Saviour-God myths not imply a desire on the part of some men to be

* *Rationalist Annual*, 1930: "Has Religion made Useful Contributions to Civilization?"

"saved"? And is not this an important fact? And is it not a curious and significant fact that, whereas our present notions of salvation are very different, the means of salvation is the same—the love of God, the inspiration of Christ? We no longer want to be saved from Hell, but some of us still want to be "saved." Mr. Russell does not, and we, for our part, find this quite intelligible, for what we want to be saved *from* is Mr. Russell's earthly Heaven. With the Psalmist we feel that it is better to trust in the Lord than to put our confidence in commissions of experts selected in a manner that Mr. Russell would approve, men with no nonsense about them.

It is well that a wind of scepticism should blow through theology more publicly than the gentle breeze that doubtless blows in theological colleges. Religion owes a debt to rationalists for forcing her to her last ditch, her proper ditch—the desire of the heart. Let us admit that science knows nothing about God, that the concept is—from the head's point of view—a convenient or inconvenient fiction. But still the rationalist must admit that the fiction *might* conceivably correspond, however inadequately, to *some* mysterious fact, like the fiction of the "self." So that the head *may* believe in God in some sense without being either intellectually dishonest, or incapable of an open mind in regard to what it is told, or invincibly stupid. Doubtless unless the heart prompts the belief, the head can find it entirely superfluous, but the fact that the heart prompts the belief does not justify other heads in regarding the belief as mere delusion, void of all "objective validity," or rather in saying so with a pretence of logical demonstration. The heart *may* be deluded, like the head, but also the heart may be *blind*, as otherwise normal individuals may be colour-blind. There is no room for argument in such cases. You see red or you don't. But doubtless if there were as few people who "saw red" as there are who "see God," we should regard them as deluded, until the physicist made the remarkable discovery that where these peculiar people were aware of a photical difference, there *was* a photical difference.

We venture to suggest, therefore, that Mr. Russell's wind of scepticism blows too hard. We even suspect that it is not the winnowing breeze of purely rational scepticism, but the gust of passion. How otherwise could he have allowed himself to imply "There is no God," instead of saying that he sees no good reason to believe in God?

The passion is excusable, and therefore we must excuse also the confusion of thought that so often attends it, as Mr. Russell so often and so properly points out. In his passion against the Church Mr. Russell is in the direct line of the prophets, and

though he does not recognize his commission, his fire is fire from Heaven. An unconscious Prometheus, he stole it. For what, in the words of St. Paul, has Mr. Russell that he did not receive? Is it a curious coincidence that Mr. Russell's social ideals are such as Christians might approve? Of course not. Mr. Russell, in prophetic indignation, may discard the name of "Christian," but he cannot undo two thousand years of history. He is not Melchisedec, without father, without mother, without descent. Are his social ideals such as Lucretius would have approved? Is his wide human sympathy—embracing all men but clergymen—only rationalized herd-instinct? Does it owe nothing to St. Paul—or whoever wrote St. Paul's letters? Of course it does. No man ever got anything out of his own head or his own heart. If Mr. Russell is right in putting so much to the debit side of the Church's account, surely he ought to figure in that account himself, and we are happy to inscribe him on the credit side. He is one of religion's more useful contributions to civilization.

We have forgiven Mr. Russell his passion, the dogmatism that goes with it and goes beyond what reason can justify, and the lack of sympathy that accompanies differences of dogma passionately maintained. And may we not forgive the teaching Church, which is only human, for her passion, her dogmatism, her often lack of sympathy? If the Church has held fast to much that we now see to be things indifferent, she has also held fast to what Mr. Russell now throws overboard along with the things indifferent. The Church may be unworthy, but she offers means of grace. Mr. Russell is very worthy, but what he offers—if he will pardon the old-fashioned terminology—is damnation, or, less technically, loss.

The business of the Church is not to lead us along the path of material progress or even of moral progress. That is the business of the clever animals we are—scientists, philosophers, statesmen economists, educationists. The business of the Church is to preach the Christian revelation, and the Christian revelation can save us from being delivered entirely into the power of the clever animals we are. Mr. Russell's social ideal is a tyranny worse than the Papacy at its worst. In his golden age the individual will have perfect freedom to express a self not his own. It sounds curiously Christian, but whereas the Christian tries consciously to do the Will of God, these will be doing unconsciously the will of Mr. Russell, which is that they should express themselves and be happy. And if the poor devils are not happy? And if the poor devils *are* happy? If they are content with the ends to which Mr. Russell shaped them? Poor devils, in any case! What shall it profit a man to have entire liberty to express Mr. Russell's self?

Common sense keeps on learning by experience—and never learns—that the pursuit of happiness defeats its own end. Does this not suggest that happiness is not the chief end of man? Mr. Russell might well complain of his Creator if unhappiness were the inevitable result of his energizing, according to his proper nature. But if man is not just a clever animal, it is to be expected that a merely animal life will not satisfy him, however refined his tastes and ample his means to gratify them, however blameless his life and full of good works. Joy is not a distinguishing character of Epicurean or Stoic, ancient or modern. But the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace.

This proposition is doubtless an unmeaning noise to Mr. Russell, and since he is unable to become as a little child, we will try to adapt it to adult capacity. First, we invert it and make it a partial answer to the question—what is "the Spirit"? Love, joy, peace are the fruits of the Spirit. Next, we ask Mr. Russell to imagine a love that is not rationalized herd-instinct, a joy that is not animal high spirits, a peace that is not apathy. We must ask him to imagine these, for they cannot be demonstrated satisfactorily to the outside observer. Thirdly, if anyone exists, or has existed, of whom these wild imaginings are true, that man is, or was, the kind of man from whom we may learn all that outside observers can learn about "the Spirit." The outside observer very frequently calls him "possessed" by a devil, and he calls himself possessed. So easy is it to lapse into appropriate mythological language.

Mr. Russell regards such a one as possessed by a spirit of hatred, and his good news is that the devil is dead, or as good as. "Hatred and fear can, with our present psychological knowledge and our present industrial technique, be eliminated altogether from human life." It is easy to understand that Mr. Russell can dispense with hatred, for the only thing worth hating is sin, and for Mr. Russell sin does not exist. It would appear that he never hated himself. But if we agree with Mr. Russell that no one ought to hate another, that no one can hate another with "perfect hatred," will he not allow us to hate ourselves with perfect hatred? We do not know the hearts of others, and if we hate their deeds and their ideals, we are not justified in hating *them*. Their intentions may be of the best, they may know no better. But the flesh is weak; we find it hard to hate the sin and love the sinner, except in our own case. Mr. Russell can do it in the case of the clerk "who suffers from a propensity to forgery." But is he so successful with the clerk in Holy Orders? No doubt he is more inclined to forgery than he has a mind to the "logic of the heart." It is easy enough to love Mr. Russell and to hate his ideals, but few men are so white and black as he. Most of us are grey.

Surely we are free to hate ourselves, however slight our acquaintance with ourselves. Surely we are free to hate ourselves, if anthropologists and psychologists have explained us to ourselves to their complete satisfaction. We are not content that they should forgive us our trespasses. Nor are we content to forgive ourselves. Illogical, doubtless, since to know all is to forgive all. Perhaps the heart is not logical. Perhaps even the most knowing heads do not know quite all. Perhaps we have a vague feeling that only Omniscience *can* forgive. What seems fairly certain is that to find one's self not entirely "sympathetic" is to be in the way of "finding God." But most of us get on with ourselves pretty well.

The religious ideal and Mr. Russell's ideal are polar opposites, though it is conceivable that their earthly Utopias might be objectively similar, since Mr. Russell is a Christian in spite of himself. The difference would be that in Mr. Russell's Utopia, such actions, opinions, thoughts, feelings as Mr. Russell approves would be the natural outcome of careful education and good institutions. The good State would have made good citizens. The other would be the realization of a prophet's dream. "I will write my law in their hearts." The citizens, with the law of God in their hearts, would have made a good State.

Strange as it may seem, it is the religious ideal, not Mr. Russell's, that is in accord with the hard logic of facts. The State has largely made *us*, but it was our fathers who made the State. Citizens get the State they deserve, and if we have not yet deserved a very good one, we have not yet deserved such a very bad one as Mr. Russell projects for us, when Mr. Russell's law will be written in our hearts. Who ever hungered and thirsted to be a good citizen? But it is not strange that Mr. Russell, to whom, as yet, the Christian revelation has revealed nothing, should revert to pre-Christian models in his ethical and political thinking.

And what guarantee, by the way, can Mr. Russell give us that *his* teaching, with its Christian spirit, will remain the important thing, from the social and historical point of view, about his new, Godless dispensation? Mr. Russell is "amiable and enlightened," like Buddha. May not Mr. Russell's "priesthood," like the Tibetan Buddhist, be "obscurantist, tyrannous, and cruel in the highest degree"? Is there some special virtue of incorruptibility in his common-sense revelation? May not his shepherds take a common-sense view of the relation of sheep to shepherd—who feedeth a flock, and eateth not of the milk of the flock?

Mr. Russell approves of truth, goodness, and beauty—not with emotion and capitals, but with rational coolness. His

truth is scientific truth, and far above the capacity of little children. "Little children cannot understand the differential calculus, or the principles of currency, or the modern methods of combating disease." We can approve the scientific mythology as wholeheadedly and as coolly as he. His goodness is behaviour according to rational human nature, and if we are given to him young enough, he will mould us to his conception of rational human nature. And beauty doubtless will be the outward and visible sign of these graces in his golden age, and the Ministry of Fine Arts its priesthood.

These, too, we can approve, and so coolly, so coldly, that by comparison we hate them. These be thy gods, O Israel! Mr. Russell's idolatry, though lacking in fervour, is as unmistakable as Aaron's. The gods revealed to his head are as sham as any ever made with hands. Idolatry is an ever-recurring weakness. We want an object of worship, but one made somewhat in our own image, one we can understand. Idolatry *is* what Mr. Russell has taken religion to be, what, indeed, the religion of most of us is. But what a "contrary" Elijah is Mr. Russell! His righteous indignation—if he will permit us to accuse him of it—is aroused at our idolatry. We have gone a-whoring after false gods, we have made our bellies our gods, we have bowed the knee to Baal. And in whose name does he say, "I hate, I despise your feasts, and I will take no delight in your solemn assemblies"? In the name of the "moral conscience of the age," enlightened by science, incarnate in himself. So he thinks. We think that Mr. Russell's idolatry is purer religion than the religion of most. It is merely his understanding that is at fault, and that has nothing to do with religion. One day, perhaps, he will write "The Analysis of Spirit." At present, his knowledge in spiritual things is on the level that confuses symbol and reality. Like the pious Catholic, he finds an object an aid to worship. His object, however, is an object of the understanding. Mr. Russell *is* a little child in spiritual matters.

This "little child" business that is such a stumbling-block to Mr. Russell can, we think, be made perfectly intelligible to him. Mr. R. B. Braithwaite has put it, "There can be no reasons in favour of mysticism." The gifts that impart insight into mathematical, medical, and psychological problems are useless even to comprehend the reasons of the heart, still more, to illumine the heart, to provide its premises. Perhaps worse than useless—perhaps it is as hard for a philosopher as for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of Heaven.

Mysticism is the life, the spirit, of religion; creeds are only its embodiments, embodied, too, by human heads, and therefore imperfect. The man who feels a certain truth can, as far as he

himself is concerned, see Mr. Russell tearing creeds to tatters with the smiling indulgence one gives a puppy worrying yesterday's newspaper. But what about the majority of us, us of little faith, for whom the ark of the covenant is sacred, who believe on authority, who already have the little philosophy that inclineth the mind to atheism, and who may think that Mr. Russell has attained depth in philosophy, or at least enough never to assert more than he knows? We need not try to frighten Mr. Russell with mill-stones. But would Mr. Russell like to feel that it had been better for us if he had never been born? Of course not. He has the best intentions for us. He would save our bodies. Good intentions of another kind did not save the Catholic Church from practices that Mr. Russell, at least, will think to have been regrettably mistaken. Nor do they save him. There are no reasons of the head for believing in God. But equally there are no reasons of the head for asserting that religion is a disease, for the implication that there is no God.

We have the best creeds our heads can devise, but the best in this kind are but shadows. In terms of logic, the concept of God is the heart's fiction, and logically it is every bit as respectable as that other heart's fiction, of animal faith, the concept of the self, which the head has not yet found intelligible, and every bit as respectable as the "moral conscience of the age." But logic is not the heart's language. Lovers do not talk logic, and Mr. Russell with his talk of the "disease of religion" merely reminds one of the pathological terms in which those not in love account for those that are. The mystic has the same difficulty as other lovers in explaining his affair to outside common sense.

There is a progressive continuity of organic life from generation to generation. There is a similar continuity of intellectual life. There is even a similar continuity of moral life. There is no *such* continuity of spiritual life. We can teach our children our science and our morality; we cannot teach them the love of God, even if we have it. We can only give them sound doctrine, and put them in the way of catching religion, in the way of someone deeply infected, if we are not, ourselves. The only continuity at our command in matters of religion is that of doctrine, and in so great a matter, is it hard to excuse the conservatism of the Church? When Aristotle was the last word in science for fifteen hundred years? And seeing that true religion is compatible with any creed?

The progress of science is *not* irrelevant to theology. Our children will be liable, like Mr. Russell, to miss the grain in the abundance of the chaff. But that is a matter for doctors of divinity, who are ready enough to admit that dogma is in the melting-pot. But now, as ever, religious truth *is* more important

than scientific truth—not that they are properly comparable, but that spiritual truth can include all scientific truth, while scientific truth, as such, knows nothing of spiritual truth. Affection is a deeper mystery than cognition. Its alpha is pain, its omega is God; its most primitive mode bodily discomfort, its most developed—not yet in Mr. Russell—the sense of sin.

Idolatry, no less than religion, testifies to a human need. False gods are the heart's mistakes, as useful, historically, in the long view, as partial scientific truths. Our approach to better conceptions of God is by an asymptotic curve, mediated by the discontent of heart or head with what, on that account, become for such hearts and heads, false gods. The discontent of the head improves our creeds. The discontent of the heart is "revelation"—when it is not blindness, the ever-recurring reversion to idolatry, the inability to worship God, who is Spirit, in spirit and in truth.

Mr. Russell has asked, "Where is now their God?" The answer is as before, "But our God is in the heavens; He hath done whatsoever He hath pleased." Let us look at Mr. Russell's idols. What is his truth? Useful "knowledge," "useful nonsense," as scientists admit. His goodness? Custom. Mr. Russell has gone to the ant for his model here. He should not take Solomon so literally. If we say there is no virtue in his goodness, he will doubtless agree, mistaking our meaning. We mean that there is no "guts" in it. He has deprived the word of all meaning. His goodness is like near-beer, looks like beer, smells like beer, tastes like beer, but does *not* intoxicate. His beauty? The outward and visible sign of his truth and his goodness. We have no objection to it except that. We have admitted that his ideal state *might look* like the City of God realized on earth.

And what will Mr. Russell's gods do for us? They will do for us, like all gods, what the hearts of the worshippers would have them do. Mr. Russell's gods will make us happy. They will give us love, joy, peace, of a sort—a sort that does not pass understanding. These gods are made in the image of the human animal.

How can we convey to Mr. Russell our conception of the difference between a highly civilized human animal and a real man? We can only do it by analogy. The civilized animal is to the real man as "mechanical" behaviour is to conscious behaviour. Most of us are automatons from the spiritual point of view. Our "good" is what is done, our "evil" what is not done. It does not follow that there are not and have not been men who know, or think they know, good and evil, apart from custom, as the will of God and the opposite. As to whether they

know, or merely think they know, the will of God, the difference is unimportant, relatively to *their* difference from those whose spiritual eyes are not open at all. That is a matter of the validity and the liability to error of the spiritual consciousness. What we are emphasizing at the moment is the fact that some men *do* know, or think they know, good and evil, while for most of us the good is the done, and the evil the not done. They have another kind of knowledge than the rest of us, another way of acting, as animals have a new way of acting, relatively to plants. These men are, as it were, the channels of grace by which we have what second-hand graces we enjoy. Before we could be the ordinary good citizens we are, there had to be prophets, martyrs, free-thinkers, apostles, men who thought they knew the will of God, who did our mechanical good *before* it was the mechanical good, because it was the will of God. The prophets' reward is notoriously not in this world, but surely the most unkindest cut of all is Mr. Russell's cool assumption that their revelations of God's will to their very unwilling worlds were self-evident truths. If Mr. Russell's enlightened reason *is* with them, it does not prove that God is not.

As to the validity or otherwise of what is given to spiritual consciousness, the case is on all fours with that of mental consciousness. The religious man is aware of God—or does he just think so ? The plain man is aware of the world—or does he just think so ? Perhaps when we have any good reasons of the head to believe in the factualness of the self and the world they will suggest the possibility of the factualness of the soul and of God.

As to the liability of men to be mistaken about the Will of God for them, no modern psychologist, even of the Freudian school, is more alive to the dubious origin of impulses than the religious man. His jargon is different, but his analysis is as subtle. It is easy enough to make play with the fact that all kinds of abominations have been perpetrated in the name of God. But we do not know the hearts of the doers of these things. It is useless to discuss whether they were mistaken about the Will of God, when we do not and cannot know whether they were trying to do the Will of God. It is of faith that who tries to do the Will of God *will* know it.

In spiritual things, as in science, experiment is the only *objective* test we have. Some few men have faith independently of the objective test, as a scientist has been known to be so certain of his theory and his calculations as to take no interest in the experiments that verified—for others—his conclusions. For those of lesser faith, the rule of thumb is: By their fruits ye shall know them. "If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar." In history the test is Gamaliel's

test: "If this counsel or this work be of man, it will come to nought: but if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it." Doubtless it is childishly easy to identify the course of events with God's Will, but it is not therefore necessarily a mistake. The Christian philosophy of history is childishly easy, but Mr. Russell's is inadequate. He misses the fact that makes it inadequate. He knows only human animals, more or less civilized, more or less rational, more or less deluded.

As regards logical respectability, there is nothing to choose between Socrates' "something divine in me," St. Paul's "Christ in me," and Mr. Russell's "moral conscience of the age in me." Mr. Russell thinks he knows what he means by his formula because Christianity has made what was a singularity in Socrates a gift—or at least an offer—to everyone born in Christendom. We can all be "dearly-born," as our forefathers called their upper classes whose wergeld was high. But because the concept of conscience is a commonplace, conscience need not the less be the sense of God—it is not, after all, so very common for the sense to be in use, and if we were as well-advised as Socrates, we should be less liable to identify our own will with the Will of God for us and for others, and so make "conscience" a scandal, an offence, a stumbling-block to Mr. Russell. The office of conscience is private and negative. It is not our good that is directly revealed to us, but our evil. And the price of maintaining and elevating our concept of the good is eternal vigilance—of the head, certainly, but chiefly of the spirit.

The essence of tragedy is the good intentions of all concerned. We have no doubt of Mr. Russell's good intentions. But we begin to understand the tragedies that have marked the history of religion, and are glad that the stake is no longer a recognized argument. The nearest we come to being cruel to be kind is to travesty our opponent's position. Mr. Russell's cruel travesty of the Christian position is easily turned against him. His argument is roughly as follows: "I and my friends are persons of amazing intelligence, virtue, and happiness. We have achieved this degree of intelligence, virtue, and happiness by discarding the fables of religion and applying common sense to the problems of life. What we have done, you can all do. And what more do you want?"

We have admitted that possibly Mr. Russell worships his idols in the spirit of true religion. That is the real tragedy of idolatry. Let Mr. Russell consider two texts in relation to each other: "Their sons and their daughters they have burnt in the fire to their gods." "Be not afraid of them that kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do."

J. C. McKerrow.

THE EVANGELICAL CONCEPTION OF THE SACRAMENTS

THE Evangelical conception of the Sacraments is best understood in the general context of Evangelical religion.

English Evangelicalism stands:

(1) For the call to decisive "conversion." Though conversion is associated with theological beliefs, the most characteristic Evangelical preachers (*e.g.*, D. L. Moody and the Keswick preachers of thirty years ago) treat it primarily as an act of *will*. They distinguish it from any emotional upheaval which may accompany it. They identify it with the sincere and explicit intention (never, of course, fully carried out), to obey God in all things.

(2) For the recognition—associated with the doctrine of the "atoning blood," of free grace, of election—that man cannot save or cleanse himself. "It is of the Lord's mercies that we are not consumed" (Lam. iii. 22). *Cf.* Eph. ii. 8, Zech. xiii. 1. Not only the forgiveness which penitence brings, but the penitence itself, is God's free gift. "It is God," etc. (Phil. ii. 13).

Notice that both (1) and (2)—especially (2)—reappear in the Neo-Evangelicalism of Karl Barth. Notice also that Evangelicals are aware that the younger Anglo-Catholics are no longer afraid—as High Churchmen were within living memory—of the word "conversion," and that Anglo-Catholics often insist that our dependence upon God is precisely the chief lesson of the Sacramental System.

Evangelicalism stands (3) for a certain negative attitude towards "good works" (Eph. ii. 9; Rom. iii. 27, etc.; Gal. ii. 16, etc.; John vi. 28 and 29; Luke xviii. 9-14). This also reappears in Barth.

It stands (4) for a partly negative attitude towards Sacraments. It is this fact with which, primarily, we are concerned here.

This negative attitude towards Sacraments is *not* based on the denial that material objects may convey grace (the ink and paper of our Bibles, the throats and lungs of our preachers, forbid such denial), but arises from positive principles.

That Evangelical teaching on the Sacraments is not solely or predominantly negative—that Evangelicals recognize that *in the Holy Communion men have attained the closest kind of union with Christ which is possible in this present world*, though this closest type of union has also been experienced (as is generally admitted) *apart* from the Sacraments—hardly needs

to be said: except to keep the balance in a discussion which turns on negations.

These negations are directed against such statements as (i.) that certain Sacraments are "universally necessary to salvation"; (ii.) that "no one can enter the Kingdom of God except he be baptized" (implied in the wording of our Baptismal office); (iii.) *Si quis dixerit Baptismum liberum esse, hoc est non necessarium ad salutem, anathema sit* (*Tridentine Canons of Baptism*, 5; Tanqueray, iii. 261); (iv.) *Nullum peccatum mortale remittitur in Nova Lege nisi per aliquod Sacramentum* (*scil. Bapt*^{m} *vel Poenit*^{m}) *in re vel in voto susceptum* (*Trent.* vi. 14; xiv. 4; Tanqueray, iii. 225); (v.) "The command, 'Do this in remembrance of me,' is one of the few positive commands of our religion."

I. To admit any ultimately "positive" command seems contrary to the Pauline conception of Christian liberty (Gal. v. 1 [*or* iv. 31] and ii. 4). The distinction is made between that which is "commanded because it is good" and that which is "good because it is commanded"; also between "moral" or "rational" duties on the one hand, and "positive" commands on the other (see, *e.g.*, Cudworth's *Eternal and Immutable Morality*). Is there any place in Christianity for the purely positive command? There may be an element of the arbitrary in ecclesiastical as in civil behaviour. If the Christian goes to Court he must wear Court dress. But if every Christian duty falls ultimately under the principle on which *all* duties hang (Matt. xxii. 40, Rom. xiii. 9), in which all commandments are "briefly comprehended," which, therefore, nothing can rightly override ("no commandment greater than these" [Mark xii. 31], "against love there is no law" [Gal. v. 23]), then no maxim of conduct can be independent of this principle or superior to it in the sense that it must not be judged by it. Christian obedience is essentially intelligent and not blind. We are not "servants," but "friends" (John xv. 15)—*i.e.*, we are under a law which we *understand*. This is of obvious practical consequence. If, *e.g.*, a missionary alleges that his flock conceives the Lord's Prayer as a charm, and therefore proposes to suspend its use, the upholder of Christian liberty will not simply quote to him, "When ye pray, say," or ask, "What are your marching orders?" He will rather discuss the *pros* and *contras* in the light of the "Royal Law according to the Scriptures" (Jas. ii. 8). (The suggestion that St. Paul was simply substituting Baptism for Circumcision, as one positive rule for another, is obviously not borne out by the language he uses.)

II. But the negations with which we are here concerned arise not only from this principle of Christian liberty. They

arise also from the Evangelical conception of grace and its conditions. Indeed, they appear to follow from the very Gospel which we preach. (*a*) The Gospel of repentance unto remission of sins (Luke xxiv. 47) proclaims true repentance as the sole, but the sure, condition of pardon: affirms that there is no such thing in the world, even for a moment, as an unpardoned penitent (*cf.* Dr. Moberly's phrase, "The divine forgiveness under the necessary condition so acts as if it were self-acting"). (*b*) Again, from forgiveness follows the bestowal of such graces as the penitent soul is fitted to receive. The returned Prodigal receives not only forgiveness and acceptance, but the robe and the ring and the fatted calf.

Thus, what is involved in (*a*) appears to contradict the assertion that Baptism is "universally necessary to salvation," and also the assertion that "Baptism, *or the wish* for Baptism," is a condition of forgiveness for the individual. It is universally admitted that Valentinian, who died during his preparation, "got what he sought." But is it not just as certain that if Valentinian, in a state of equally sincere penitence, had been kept back from Baptism, not by accident, but by a muddle-headed or wrong-headed Quakerism, he would have "got what he sought" none the less? Bishop Gore would answer "Yes," but suggests that to abandon the language about the necessity of Baptism would be to confuse what God may do in His mercy with that which is "open and covenanted." (I take Father Thornton's position to be similar. See *The Congress Books*, No. 30.) But if we admit that the *wish* for Baptism may suffice (*Sum. Theol.*, iii. 68, 2; *cf.* above *aut in re aut in voto susceptum*), must we not go further? What men are really thinking of when they speak thus of the *votum* is not the wish for Baptism as such—*i.e.*, the wish to be baptized for *any motive*—but the wish to be baptized for the *right* motive. *Cf.* the elaborate Roman discussions about the Sacrament *ficte susceptum*, and the revival—*reviviscentia*—of the sacramental grace when the obstacle is removed. See, *e.g.*, Tanqueray, *Syn. Theol. Dogm.*, iii., § 319, etc. But the wish to be baptized for the right motive—*i.e.*, that one may sincerely live the Christian life—involves the "penitent and obedient heart" which Evangelical Christianity represents as the true condition of forgiveness. Thus the Roman qualifications—dictated by the strong Roman common sense—sometimes bring the Roman doctrine nearer in practice than it sounds in words to the Evangelical position. Yet, if it is true that the penitent is assuredly forgiven, whether baptized or not, and that the impenitent is not forgiven, however much he uses the Sacraments, are not the Catholic phrases above quoted every one of them misleading? Far from speaking of

what the penitent Quaker receives as "uncovenanted," the Evangelical wishes to affirm that the forgiveness of the penitent as such is the very heart of the Christian covenant. On the other hand, there is no implication here that Baptism is purely "optional." If this is what is intended by *liberum* in the Tridentine anathema (see above), the antithesis suggested by the anathema is a false one. The argument, "If pardon and grace is received by the unbaptized penitent, and is *not* received by the impenitent, even though baptized, therefore Baptism is at the best an edifying but unimportant ceremony," is not valid. Human nature being what it is, the Sacramental System is among the most effective means by which the Gospel of Forgiveness is proclaimed, by which penitence is caused and confirmed. The Sacramental System is not merely "not useless." In relation to the life of the Church at large it may truly be called necessary. Without some form of external ordinances no Church life is possible. Nor is the particular form of the Sacraments arbitrary. We may admit them peculiarly adapted to human nature, as God has wisely (and therefore not arbitrarily) ordered it. But it is one thing to say that a particular ordinance holds a necessary place in the development of the Church's ministry of salvation, and another to say that that ordinance, or the wish for it, is the necessary condition to the reconciliation of each individual sinner with God.

With regard to (*b*) the positive principle in question is that which is expressed in the text, "Ask, and ye shall have," interpreted by James iv. 3: "Ye ask and receive not, *because ye ask amiss*"—*i.e.*, with wrong intention. These texts appear to set forth the law of God's giving. The right will (which true prayer expresses) is set forth as the condition for our reception of certain gifts and graces from God. Christians of all schools would probably agree in the defence they would make to the charge that Christian prayer implied favouritism or arbitrary behaviour on the part of God. "God, who wills all good for men, gives to each such gifts as he is fitted to receive with profit. God sends rain on the just and unjust: but when God waits till we pray, this is because our right will and our right understanding of His gifts (which prayer expresses) makes us fit (not worthy) to receive gifts which, if we were in another frame of mind, would not be for our good." In this connection it would be admitted that any *arbitrary* obstacles to the reception of this gift, any *arbitrary* rules of their distribution, *bonitati divinæ repugnant*. (Such a conception of the divine method need not imply a narrowly individualistic theory. God may withhold gifts from me which I am personally fitted to use in order that I may later receive them with fuller profit to the

whole Church in union with my brethren—that I without them should not be made perfect [Heb. xi. 40].) Again, there is nothing in this conception which is inconsistent with the recognition of the necessity of the Sacraments in the sense suggested above. It requires no very deep knowledge of human nature to see that a lowered apprehension of God would have followed (not so much, perhaps, in people of the Quaker temperament as in others) if the Church as a whole had followed the lead of the Quakers. Again, if the Washing of Feet (John xiii.) had taken the place of the Eucharist—*i.e.*, if the Church had selected John xiii. 14 for literal fulfilment instead of Luke xxii. 19*b*—the loss would have been hardly less. It is therefore consistent to say, on the one hand, "The sole obstacle to the reception of those gifts which God is eager to bestow on man is some wrong state of *mind*—some defect of will, apprehension, or feeling," and to say, on the other, "Sacraments are true means of grace, since they produce and strengthen the right states of mind by which those obstacles are removed." If this is spoken of as their "psychological" effect, the word must not be narrowly interpreted—*i.e.*, it is not to be assumed that we are thinking only of the stirring of emotions or only of clear thinking, or only of both of these. The slow production, through ages of Church life, of the conviction that, "even if our faith is small and our hearts cold," we can rely on God's fidelity to His promise, is to be reckoned among the "psychological" effects of the Eucharist. (The theories of the Master of Corpus have interest in this connection.)

Thus with regard to both (*a*) and (*b*) the Evangelical interest is primarily pastoral. We wish to preach a Gospel unhampered by ecclesiastical restriction: to be able to say freely, "If you repent, you are assuredly forgiven, however negative may be your attitude to ordinances or to theology": to say, "If you ask, not 'amiss,' but in the right frame of mind, you will assuredly receive. Your negative attitude towards theology or Sacraments will be no obstacle to grace except so far as it reflects a wrong mental state (*e.g.*, extreme individualism is consistent with sincere penitence, but it generally implies the sort of moral defect by which prayer is hindered)." The Roman theology—since the Tridentine use of the words "confer" and "contain"—has discussed three modes of the "causality" of Sacraments, distinguished respectively by the keywords *moralis*, *physica*, and *intentionalis*. With regard to the physical theory, we are primarily interested in the question whether it introduces some *other* obstacle to the reception of God's gifts than the obstacle of spiritual unfitness to receive them: whether it can fail to introduce the notion of arbitrary restriction.

Let us suppose, then, that someone replies, "I fully accept the principle which you deduce from Matt. vii. 7 and Jas. iv. 3. I admit to the full that God never withholds His gifts for any arbitrary reason. But what I am asserting is merely a theory of the *means* by which God gives His gifts, a theory *de modo quo gratia confertur*."

A well-known thinker has asked me "why, in view of the dependence of conscious life on material facts in the constitution of the brain, I object to the doctrine that the sacramental elements are a causal link in the chain by which God works (directly and otherwise than by conscious or subconscious suggestion) upon the soul of man."

I ask, first, whether the analogy would be seriously carried out. My questioner admits that "if he found that the Prayer of Consecration had been inadvertently omitted he would not doubt that he had made his communion." He would not, I think, say, "If your brain is injured, God will not let a material accident of this sort interfere with your thinking." In this connection I think we shall do well just to consider whether the qualifications we always introduce (*potentia Dei sacramentis visibilibus non alligatur*) do not, in fact, render the suggested law of physical causation nugatory. Does the lack of a valid Sacrament, as such—apart from defects of will, feeling, or apprehension, which are its cause or its effect—make any difference in the graces we receive? If we say "No," is not the supposed physical causation otiose? Does not the theory become baseless? If we say "Yes," are we not going back upon what *ex hypothesi* we have admitted? (see paragraph before last).

Secondly, there are difficulties in the theory itself. The effect of the Sacrament is suspended if we are spiritually unfit: if we are spiritually fitted to receive grace, the lack of the Sacrament is made good to us in spiritual communion. This is unlike the methods of physical causation. Where the absence of a cause was always compensated for, it would be difficult ever to prove its presence or activity. We all recognize laws of Nature—the dependence, *e.g.*, of mind upon brain. We recognize also certain laws of grace which (as we should most of us admit) may sometimes necessitate even the working of miracle ("shall say to this mountain," Mark xi. 23). The mode of causality which the words quoted above—and perhaps certain Roman arguments too—presuppose, seems to fall under neither heading: and to conflict with the requirements of both. It suggests that the Eucharist is a miracle; a belief which, if it is implied, should be expressed (*cf.* Roman discussions*). In this connection it is worth while to insist that the laws of Nature are not arbitrary,

* *Summa Theol.* III. lxxvi. 5. ad. 2^{m} *vel saltem miraculose sicut*, etc.

but good: that, for a Theist, the kingdom of Nature is itself a subordinate element in the kingdom of grace. I am not saying that these difficulties are insuperable: but they have to be met.

Thirdly, is any notion of physical causation consistent either with a spiritual theory of prayer or with Christian liberty? Sacraments are sometimes so conceived that the method in which we deal with them is based wholly on their symbolic character. *Sacramentum, cum sit signum, habere nequit causalitatem quæ prætergrediatur rationem signi* (*cf.* Tanqueray, iii. 310). The moment one drops into physical or quasiphysical conceptions, and conceives the consecrating effect of the priest's hand after the analogy of a physical agency—or wonders whether in a particular case the "contact has been properly made"—are we not getting near to the pagan frame of mind: to the conception of strange, mysterious powers which, if wrongly handled, may do us harm? When a young clergyman had spilled the contents of a chalice on his surplice and asked in alarm what he ought to do, a wise Anglo-Catholic answered: "Have the surplice washed, of course." But I know of a case where real trouble of conscience was allowed to arise from a similar incident. Again, in my own undergraduate days I burdened my conscience —without any of the emotions which might have justified the action by making it a labour of love—with the task of rescuing crumbs carelessly thrown about at Holy Communion. The care about the elements which follows from a right estimate of symbolism is rational. The other kind of care is surely superstition. But it seems to be the natural result not only of any *physical*, but of any *non-psychological*, theory of sacramental causality.

I have been told that my "unwillingness to distinguish the gift given from our reception of it (*cf.* Quick's *The Christian Sacraments*, p. 130) is parallel to the Hedonist's refusal to distinguish the object we desire from our pleasure in having the desire fulfilled." But are the cases parallel? We must not identify, *e.g.*, the *flight* of the French at Quebec with the *happiness* given thereby to the dying Wolfe. The former event might have occurred without the latter. In the case of the "unworthy recipient" we may recognize (1) God's will to give grace, and also (2) the whole system of external ordinances in which this will is embodied, as an objective element, distinct from the subjective events in the recipient's soul. But in what sense is something *given* which is not *received*? It appears to be represented as something which remains suspended in the elements themselves. Under what category, mental, physical, or otherwise, am I expected to conceive it? Are not giving and re-

ceiving correlatives? This kind of difficulty seems to arise in many Anglican attempts to distinguish the *res* from the *virtus*.

The general conclusion I arrive at is that every sacramental theory is to be judged by the ethical attitude with which it coheres. I am prepared to defend myself against the charge that this is Pragmatism.

It is, for example, part of human duty to investigate natural law by systematic methods, and also, if we are Theists, to think out a conception of the Universe in general consistent with the belief that God is bound by the law of His own goodness. The relation of this principle to a "psychological" theory of sacramental causality I have tried to indicate. This theory leads to an ethic of freedom. Does any rival theory do the same? We ought, I think, to consider carefully the ethical results of a definitely *physical* theory of sacramental causality: and even more carefully the results of an indeterminate theory, which regards the psychological explanation as insufficient, but refuses further to define. (1) If we say, "There is something *more* in the Sacraments, especially in the Eucharist, than the psychological theory admits: but I do not know *anything* as to the *nature* of that further element," this lays us open, among other difficulties, to the retort, "Then it *may* be something of the sort suggested by Cienfuegos (and in English by the late Father Dalgairns) or something with even more terrifying consequences still." (*Christus exercet sensus suos etiam in statu sacramentali ut possit vere nos audire et videre.*) (2) Any language which implies that there is some *higher* and *better* mode of union with Christ than that mental and moral union which the Evangelical theory affirms seems open to criticism. Someone has recently said that what Evangelicals have at heart in these discussions is what Kant is seeking to express in § 89 of the *Critique of Judgment*: "Man cannot please or approach the Supreme Being by other means than by a moral disposition" (*Gesinnung*; Bernard, p. 393, unfortunately translates it by "sentiment").

The general problem here involved needs discussion in special relation to the different Sacraments. A special problem, which the Romans discuss in relation to the *character* left by Baptism (see, *e.g.*, Tanqueray, iii. 309), was touched on at Bishopthorpe last May. With regard to Transubstantiation there is need of some detailed discussion. If we say, "It belongs to an obsolete philosophy," we must be clear as to *what* is obsolete. Not, surely, the whole distinction between substance and accident. I should prefer to say a "misapplied philosophy." "If substance and attribute can be *distinguished*, they may by miracle be *separated*." This kind of argument, and the conception of *dimensiva quantitas* as taking on, miraculously, the

character of a substance (see discussions in Tanqueray, iii., p. 404), is all of it peculiarly vulnerable.* The doctrine, in fact, is not materialistic, but is it not sophistic?

With regard to the Eucharist there arises the question, "Is there at consecration any change in the elements themselves?"† Now the whole dialectic of "in self" and "for other" is notoriously perplexing. (If I ask, "Is drink evil *in itself*?" the retort may be made, "In itself—out of relation to us—it is not even *drink*.") When, therefore, Lord Cushendun says that the question is simple, I find myself, on this direct issue, in respectful agreement with the Archbishop of York. If, however, anyone were to say that we are concerned here with a difference of *temperament*, since there are always those to whom, *e.g.*, the Union Jack will be a mere piece of bunting, I venture to suggest that primarily it is a matter not of temperament, but of *context*. If on Armistice Day I find a boy throwing mud at the flag, I shall tell him that it is the symbol of our national unity, and I shall not accept his coldness of patriotic temperament as an excuse. If next day, when the flag is being carried away in a flood, I find that he has taken my rebuke so much to heart that he proposes to rescue it at peril of his life, I shall then tell him that in this context the flag *is* merely a piece of bunting. I imagine that, so far, there would not be much dispute. Can we discuss the question of our treatment of the Eucharist on the general principle here implied? I am not, for the moment, thinking of the special question of reservation. My behaviour in relation to any particular rite would, I think, be governed by the significance which those who practised it attached to it: in part, therefore, by their "temperament." What I am contending for is *general*—namely, the right and duty of governing all my behaviour, in relation to the Eucharist or anything else, on *wholly rational and intelligible principles*: the recognition that the Eucharist is made for man, and not man for the Eucharist: that therefore all rules of Eucharistic observance (as of the observance of days) are subordinate to the edification of the Church, and are to be judged in relation to the good of man in the widest sense—*i.e.*, by the principle in which all commandments are "briefly comprehended." There are many

* *Cf. Summa Theol.*," III. lxxvi. 5.

† A child said to his father, "I love this present as much as I love *you*"; and evidently conceived himself to be expressing great affection. This perfectly intelligible "identification" of the gift—in itself of small value—with the giver throws light on some of the Eucharistic phrases. In these questions, considered generally, our main troubles arise from vagueness. The "physical" theory of Sacramental causation, if held, should be worked out with uncompromising clearness. To an Evangelical of sensitive spirit, the Roman books are sometimes pleasanter reading than some Anglican theology. The Anglican reluctance to "define" tends to cover up what ought to be brought into clear daylight. The way to peace is certainly not through obscurity.

elements in human good to which I am at present blind: in regard to which I must humbly seek enlightenment. But rational obedience surely implies that at each stage I must seek to be guided by principles which I understand: not by rules based on the supposition of mysterious and unintelligible facts. (Such an ethical attitude coheres with a theology which thinks of God rather as *revealed* than as *hidden—latens*—in the Eucharist.) I venture to think that there *is* a simple issue here, and that it is what lies behind the questions of Lord Cushendun and Lord Brentford. Such an attitude is far from seeking to abolish all mystery. It may *glory* in mystery. The mystery it would banish is *that which brings moral bondage.* "The Christian," said Feuerbach, "is an *esprit fort.*" That this phrase expresses a vital aspect of Christianity can be shown, I hold, not only from St. Paul, but from the Gospels.

C. J. SHEBBEARE.

PEKIN MAN AND IMMORTALITY*

Ps. xxx. 9: "Shall the dust praise thee? shall it declare thy truth?"

My chief intellectual interest, as some among you may know, is the study of the relations between science and religion. Because many have similar interests, I venture to speak to-night of the problem of human immortality, and I shall relate this problem to the recent discovery of subhuman fossil remains colloquially termed Pekin Man. Most of my hearers will have read of the finding of these fossil fragments, for they have attracted the eager attention of all who speculate as to the past of humanity. We first heard of Pekin Man in 1926 when the finding of two tell-tale teeth was reported. Since then further discoveries, surprising and gratifying in their extent, have been announced. This evening it will be convenient if I first indicate the significance of the Chinese discovery. Subsequently I will pass to that question of human immortality which increasingly perplexes many who are gradually realizing that the fact of man's animal origin must be conceded.

May I at the outset remind you that it was in 1871 that Charles Darwin published his book *The Descent of Man.* In that volume he put forward a strong argument for the theory that man had gradually been evolved from an ape-like stock. But even sixty years ago the theory was not new, for it had been propounded by the great biologist Lamarck in 1809.

* A sermon by the Bishop of Birmingham, preached in Manchester Cathedral on Sunday evening, March 2, 1930.

Darwin, however, marshalled so skilfully an impressive mass of facts that within a generation most experts were converted to his views.

Meanwhile the mass of men, incredulous or conservative and often influenced by religious tradition, said: "Show us a missing link. Where is some fossil, half-ape, half-man, which shall prove that you are right?" The demand was not unfair, the more so as biologists conceded that, if Darwin's view was correct, there must have been a whole series of links between man and the anthropoid apes.

Now the first discovery of a fossil analogous to a missing link was made by Dubois, a Dutch army doctor, in 1891. He found in Java a skull-cap, a thigh-bone, and two teeth—scanty fragments, but sufficient to establish that there had existed in the distant past "the Java ape-man." From the geological formation in which the remains of this creature were found, it was inferred that he probably existed before the European ice-ages began. Now to measure recent epochs of geological time is singularly difficult: curiously enough, the age of ancient rocks is more easily determined. However, we may perhaps say roughly that the Java ape-man flourished 500,000 years ago.

Was he ape or man? Experts differ. Could he speak? The skull-development was indecisive. He might have had the rudiments of speech.

After the Java fossil fragments were found—and they were miserably scanty—some twenty years passed during which there was no similar discovery. Then in 1911, at Piltdown in Sussex, fragments—painfully inadequate—of a skull and half a lower jaw were discovered by two English geologists. To reconstruct the skull has proved difficult: it is, however, human with ape-like characters. But the jaw is almost entirely ape-like. Probably this Piltdown "man of the dawn" was further on the road to humanity than the Java ape-man. Possibly he lived in Sussex 400,000 years ago.

After the Sussex fragments were dug up fifteen years passed before the finding of two teeth, some twenty-five miles from Pekin, gave promise of a further similar discovery. Since 1926, from the cave or fissure in the limestone rocks at Chou-kou-tien, a number of fragments of ape-like men have been found amid a mass of bones of mammals, such as flourished at the beginning of the ice-ages. Finally, at the beginning of December last, a young Chinese geologist found a complete sub-human skull embedded in rock. Several months will be needed to free it from its matrix. But in due course experts will be able to tell us from the size, shape, and interior markings of the skull something as to the quality of the brain of the sub-man of Pekin.

Then we shall know more fully what rudimentary man was like 400,000 years ago, when the marks of his ape-like origin were many, both upon and within him. Another page of man's evolution will be written. Think, in particular, of the significance of the fact that primitive sub-men were in Sussex, Java, and Pekin at the beginning of the long distant ice-ages. Does it not suggest that they had spread from some point in Central Asia where under Divine Providence those brain changes occurred which were ultimately to lead to ourselves?

Probably none of these ape-men were in the direct line of our ancestry. Rather they were cousins, types which did not mature. Yet they were products of that same process of change of which we are the ultimate consequences. Possibly Chinese Turkestan was the land where man began. In due time further investigation will put an end to present ignorance. Patient search and good fortune will gradually reveal the fossil records of the beginning of the human races which now cover the earth.

How do discoveries, such as that of Pekin Man, affect theological belief? I know, from numerous letters which come to me, that many are perplexed as to how it is possible, in the light of our growing certainty as to man's animal origin, to believe that the soul of man is immortal. I am asked whether Pekin Man had an immortal soul. At what stage of our evolution did the soul within us become worthy of eternal life? Alternatively, must we not allow that we, too, must perish absolutely at death as do the animals from which we have sprung? Now, before I put before you my own thoughts on these difficult questions, let me admit that our knowledge is still deplorably limited. We see as in a glass darkly. Practically all origins are shrouded in mystery. What is the origin of the constituents of matter: are they eternal? How did the stellar universe come into existence? Whence came the rotatory movement that we everywhere observe? What is the origin of life? Where did mind come from when it first showed itself upon the cooling earth? We can hardly guess at the answers to these questions. Equally we cannot say when moral consciousness began. Yet with the beginning of moral consciousness, with the eating of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, as the old story has it, man made the step which decisively separated him from all other animals upon earth.

Many arguments for the immortality of the soul, some good, some bad, have been put forward. But I personally am convinced that the ground of a reasonable belief in personal immortality is to be found in the fact that men realize that they ought to be loyal to goodness and truth, and show such loyalty.

Because we cannot admit that the wages of goodness are dust and nothing more, we are forced to claim that eternal life will be the reward of righteousness. The Psalmist felt the absurdity of annihilation: "Shall the dust praise thee: shall it declare thy truth?" The good man, we believe, will survive after bodily death because he has survival-value. We could not continue to think of the Universe as rational, or its Creator as other than a capricious maker of useless experiments, if men who have sought to serve Him perish utterly as their bodies decay.

Instinctively the civilized man believes that personal morality is of the highest importance. Obedience to the moral law is man's gift to his Maker. Surely such a gift cannot be made in vain. Yet in vain would the gift be made if personal immortality is a delusive hope. For, although our service to God aids our fellowmen and so endures upon earth after we are gone, yet in the fulness of time humanity will vanish from this planet, and nothing will remain upon it of all man's moral attainment and spiritual striving. Either God must waste what surely He pronounces good and acceptable to Himself, or in the man who gives God service there must be something that is immortal.

Thus I say that when in the ape growing to the stature of man there first appeared a faint understanding of the moral law, at that moment a something worthy of eternal life was born in him. Then the process of soul-making began: the animal began to put on humanity.

If you enquire as to the future status of such primitive souls as must at first have emerged, I can give no answer. Are there not in our own experience problems raised by the untimely deaths of children which are similarly insoluble? Will there be no further development of personality for any of us after our sojourn here is ended? I, for one, cannot believe that a static future awaits us. I look rather for development, achievement, enrichment, even unto "the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ."

Personality, as we know it, is a most mysterious thing; but almost certainly it is on earth as imperfect as it is mysterious. As we see it, it is linked to a particular development of brain and nervous system, so that we cannot imagine the existence of mind apart from such development. Yet assuredly mind is no product of matter. The higher may only be able to manifest itself through the lower; but it is not derived from it.

Similarly I would urge that the distinctive personality of man is not rightly to be thought of as derived *in toto* from the mind of the ape. There appeared, when the human soul began, a new quality of being witnessed to by man's moral conscious-

ness. That quality is, I believe, fundamentally independent of the organized matter needed for its manifestation. Of course, we cannot imagine the existence of personality independent of matter, for we are made of the dust of the earth. Remember, however, that the poverty of man's imagination has become a distressing axiom of modern physics. If sound argument leads us to regions where imagination fails we need not in dismay retrace our steps.

So though man may be one of a group of mammals more or less closely akin to himself, though we must allow that he is but the highest emergent of that phase of earth's history which geologists call the mammalian era, we need not hesitate to say that he is decisively separated from all other animals, nor need we hesitate to claim that in him is a soul which, if true to its own nature, shall enjoy eternal life. All admit that the intellectual powers of man are vastly superior to those of all other living things. Why, then, do we so often ignore the fact that his moral and spiritual understanding similarly set him apart? By virtue of his spiritual growth he has become aware that goodness, beauty, and truth belong to the essential nature of things. He has thus been led to a knowledge of God; and he serves God as he seeks to be loyal to the moral law.

Had Pekin Man moral instincts? Did he strive to live by an Inner Light, however dim? If so, he was on the side of the immortals. If so, though the sub-species to which he belonged has passed from the earth, it is not unrepresented in the realm of God where nothing of value is ever wasted.

Some day humanity, as we know it, will no longer exist upon this planet. Our race also will have passed away. But all that we have done to serve God and to promote the coming of His Kingdom upon earth will be preserved in that spiritual Kingdom where the souls of the righteous shall be with God.

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

AMONG contributors to the present volume, Mr. W. W. Cannon is an accomplished O.T. scholar, whose special studies of the 68th Psalm and of other passages and books of O.T. are well known in Germany as well as in this country. Mr. Shebbeare is Rector of Stanhope, the parish of Bishop Butler. He has recently received the unusual distinction of being elected Master of the local Hare Hunt. This is the first time, we believe, that a Master of Beagles has contributed to THEOLOGY, but we have no doubt that he will prove as distinguished a Master as he is a theologian. We may hope that another Benozzo Gozzoli may be found to do justice to the " Domini canes " of Stanhope.

The Rev. H. N. Vincent Tonks, Hon. Secretary of the Anglo-Catholic Congress Overseas Association, 200A Abbey House, Westminster, S.W. 1, writes that he would be glad to supply names and addresses to any of our readers who would be willing to forward their copies of THEOLOGY to missionaries overseas. We are glad to publish his request, as we have published similar ones before. But we feel bound to add that any of our contributors who can afford to do so would be doing a better service to THEOLOGY if they could order additional copies for this purpose. The Journal has to pay its way like any other, and its success in doing so depends on its monthly sales and subscriptions.

We have received copies of *Eucharistic Meditations* (2s. net) and *Blessed Sacrament Devotions*, compiled by the Rev. Fr. G. Sampson, C.R., and published by the Faith Press. Both contain many things that will be helpful to communicants. We have also received a copy of *Forms of Service* for use in Sedbergh School Chapel. Those who know the tendency of Chapel Services to become a matter of routine will delight in the alternatives here provided, which seem to us excellent alike in structure and diction. The Headmaster of Sedbergh and his colleagues are to be congratulated on such a compilation, and we hope that its use will not be restricted to the home of its origin. Acknowledgment is made in the Preface to the Grey Book, Part III., to Prof. Dearmer's *The Sanctuary*, and to *Cambridge Offices and Orisons*.

CORRESPONDENCE

(1)

SIR,

There is one point in Mr. H. G. Wood's criticism of Dr. Lowther Clarke's *New Testament Problems* which seems to call for a word of criticism. He says with regard to Dr. Lowther Clarke's statement that reserve was necessary about the story of the virgin birth because it was liable to be associated with dangerous heathen myths, " What ground have we for supposing that the early Christians regarded these myths as myths or felt

the association with such myths to be dangerous?" He then quotes the Apology of Justin Martyr, who tries to commend the story of the virgin birth to the Roman authorities by appealing to their beliefs about Perseus. If Justin, who was born of heathen parents, and who was finally converted to Christianity after passing through various phases of heathen philosophy, used this *argumentum ad hominem*, as he did several times in this same chapter, this in no way proves or even makes likely that heathen myths would not be regarded as "dangerous," to say the least of it, in the Jewish surroundings in which St. Luke's story was obviously produced. We know little of St. Luke, but we do know that he was a companion of St. Paul, and that to him the gods of the heathen were "devils."

It is really extraordinary what far-fetched and improbable arguments certain writers will use to discredit even such a moderate and reasonable statement of the evidence for the virgin birth as that given by Dr. Lowther Clarke.

Yours faithfully,
H. P. V. NUNN.

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(2)

DEAR SIR,

In their valuable contributions to your Journal on the subject of the relation of Confirmation to Baptism, I am surprised to notice that neither Professor Morris nor Dr. N. P. Williams makes allusion to the interesting distinction between the precise gift of the spirit in the two Sacraments drawn by Dr. Goudge in his *Commentary on* 1 *Corinthians* (p. 112). He there suggests that the work of the Spirit in Baptism corresponds to the Gift of Easter (John xx. 22, 23), that is, a raising to new life after death, whereas in the laying on of hands the Holy Spirit comes as He came at Pentecost (Acts ii. 4), giving powers appropriate to that new life. A similar view is, I believe, put forward by the late Bishop Chase in his book *Confirmation*.

I am, Sir,
Yours, etc.,
T. A. GOOD.

NOTES

I.—SELECTIONS FROM WHEATLEY "ON THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER"

THE Rev. Charles Wheatley's *Rational Illustration of the Book of Common Prayer* is often referred to but little known. The writer's dates are 1686–1742. The first edition of the book was 1710. The preface to the copy in my possession is dated 1722, and the title-page bears the date 1846. A recent reading of the book gave me so much pleasure that I made some extracts for the benefit of readers of THEOLOGY. The reason for selection has been as a rule that the passage throws light either on interesting liturgical customs which have now died out, or upon matters still controverted among us. The round brackets include summaries of Wheatley, the square brackets my own comments.

W. K. L. C.

Introductory Discourse.

Our Liturgy was therefore first established by the Convocations or provincial Synods of the realm, and thereby became obligatory *in foro conscientiae*; and was then confirmed and ratified by the supreme magistrate in parliament, and so also became obligatory *in foro civili* (28, 29).

The Calendar.

(Valentine was) so famous for his love and charity, that the custom of *choosing valentines* upon his festival, which is still practised, took its rise from thence (50).

Daily Service.

Our reformers not approving the priests performing by themselves what ought to be the united devotions of many; and yet not being willing wholly to discharge the clergy from a constant repetition of their prayers, thought fit to discontinue these solitary devotions; but at the same time ordered, that if a congregation at church could not be had, the public service, both for morning and evening, should be recited in the family where the minister resided (70).

[The intention in allowing a married clergy was to have homes of family devotion. The Reformers would have been startled to hear a Vicar's wife saying "I married the man, not the clergyman."]

Ornaments Rubric.

(After describing the surplice, hood, and rochet.) The other things prescribed and enjoined by the forementioned rubrics, though now grown obsolete and out of use, are the alb, the cope, the tunicle, and the pastoral staff (90).

(Of the two lights on the altar.) These lights . . . are still continued in most, if not all, cathedral and collegiate churches and chapels, so often as divine service is performed by candle-light; and ought also, by this rubric, to be used in all parishes churches and chapels at the same times (92).

Morning and Evening Prayer.

("The accustomed place" is the chancel), the accustomed place before the second Common Prayer Book of King Edward. For it cannot be supposed that this second book, which lasted only one year and a half, could establish a custom (93). [An important principle.]

(Of the rubric for the First Lesson—"he that readeth so standing and turning himself, as he may best be heard.") Which shews, that in time of prayer the minister used to look another way; a custom still observed in some parish-churches, where the reading-pews have two desks; one for the Bible, looking towards the body of the church to the people; another for the Prayer Book, looking towards the east or upper end of the chancel (121).

(The Jubilate at Matins and Psalm 67 at Evensong) ought . . . not to be sung in Steinhold and Hopkins, or any other metre, as is now the custom in too many churches (126).

And to sing a different psalm between the lesson and the psalm appointed, is no less irregular. And therefore certainly this (after the third collect) must be the most proper place for singing (136).

The Litany.

The singing of this office by laymen, as practised in several cathedrals and colleges, is certainly very unjustifiable (143).

Collects, Epistles, and Gospels.

Whenever the collect of a Sunday or Holy-day is read at the evening service before, the *weekly collect* that had been in course must be omitted and give place. And the same rule, I take it, should be observed upon the holy-day itself, upon which no other collect ought to be used, but the proper one for the day (168). [A piece of liturgical knowledge which 200 years later has not become universal.]

(Midlent-Sunday, otherwise called Refreshment Sunday.) The reason of which, I suppose, is the Gospel for the day, which treats of our Saviour's miraculously feeding five thousand; or else perhaps the first lesson in the morning, which gives us the story of Joseph's entertaining his brethren. And the appointment of these Scriptures upon this day might probably give the first rise to a custom still retained in many parts of England, and well known by the name of *Midlenting* or *Mothering* (191). [He apparently takes *Mothering* as a popular corruption of *Midlenting*.]

It may not be amiss to observe, that the church doors used to be all set open on this day (Thursday before Easter), to signify that penitent sinners, coming from north or south, or any part of the world, should be received to mercy, and the Church's favour (193).

The Holy Communion.

(Opening rubric. In the full sense none are "*notorious* evil livers") but such as the sentence of the law hath, either upon their own confession, or full conviction, declared to be so. . . . *Notoriety* in this place is taken in a lower degree; the rubric using the words *open* and *notorious* for the same thing, and explaining those to be *notorious* by whom *the congregation is offended*. That it cannot mean those whom the *law* has declared to be notorious, is plain, because such are supposed to be already shut out from the Communion, and consequently the Curate must himself have received notice from his Ordinary not to admit them (222, 3).

(The Rubric after the Nicene Creed, what holy-days or fasting-days are to be observed.) The first reason of which was, lest the people should observe any such days as had been formerly kept, but were laid aside at the Reformation. . . . This danger is now pretty well over (232, 3).

(Nothing to be published in church but what is prescribed by the Prayer Book or enjoined by the King, or by the Ordinary.) All this was undoubtedly added, to prevent the custom, that still too much prevails in some country churches, of publishing the most frivolous, unbefitting, and even ridiculous things in the face of the congregation (233, 4).

(The collection by the deacons or churchwardens.) The deacons are the most proper persons for this business, it being the very office for which their order was instituted. . . . In other places they collect at the entrance into the chancel, where the people make their offerings as they draw towards the altar (237).

The ordering that the *communicants shall be conveniently placed for the receiving of the holy Sacrament*, before the Minister reads the exhortation, seems to have an eye to an old custom, still retained in some country churches, where the communicants kneel in rows one behind another, and there continue till the Minister comes to them (247).

(The petition for the descent of the Holy Ghost upon the Sacramental elements) upon the scruples of Bucer . . . was left out at the review in the fifth of King Edward; and the following sentence, which he was pleased to allow of, inserted in its stead; viz., *Hear us . . . partakers of his most blessed Body and Blood: who in the same night, etc.* In these words, it is true, the sense of the former is still implied, and consequently by these the elements are now consecrated, and so become the body and blood of our Saviour Christ. (He refers to the rubric about re-consecration.) This rubric was added in the last review: but to what end, unless to save the Minister some time, does not appear. (Taken from the Scotch Liturgy. The Calvinists and Lutherans agree with the Papists as against the primitive liturgies in making the Words of administration the consecration). . . . The words which our Saviour spoke to His disciples could not be the whole consecration of the elements, but rather a declaration of the effect which was produced by his consecrating or blessing them (254-6).

(Our Church disallows solitary masses), not permitting the Priest to consecrate the elements, unless he has *three at least* to communicate with him, because our Saviour seems to require *three* to make up a congregation (273).

Public Baptism of Infants.

(To be after the second lesson.) The reason of which I take to be, because by that time the whole congregation is supposed to be assembled: which shows the irregularity, which prevails much in some churches, of putting off christenings till the whole service is over, and so reducing them, by the departing of the congregation, to almost private baptisms (290).

However, it being allowed to *weak* children, though strong enough to be brought to church, to be baptized by affusion; many fond ladies at first, and then by degrees the common people, would persuade the Minister that their children were too tender for dipping. . . . In the latter times of Queen Elizabeth, and during the reigns of King James and King Charles I. there were but very few children dipped in the font (301).

The Catechism.

In many large parishes, where the inhabitants are numerous, the Minister thinks himself obliged to catechise every Sunday; whilst in parishes less populous, a few Sundays in the year are sufficient for the purpose; and therefore in such places the duty of Catechism is reserved till Lent (323).

Solemnization of Matrimony.

Sometimes . . . the churchwardens, or other officers of the parish, presume to forbid the publication of the banns, because the parties are *poor*, and so like to create a charge to the parish; or because the man is not perhaps an *inhabitant*, according to the laws for the settlement of the poor (340).

(Marriages in Lent forbidden because those who have wives should then be as those who have none); and therefore those who have none ought not then to change their condition. . . . To prohibit marriage by banns, and admit of it by license, seems not to be calculated for the increase of religion, but purely for the sake of enhancing the fees (342).

Burial of the Dead.

The *time* generally appointed for this is late in the *evening*. . . . As death is a *sleep*, and the grave a *resting place*, the *night* is not improper for these solemnities. . . . To express their hope that their friend is not lost for ever, each person in the company usually bears in his hand a sprig of *rosemary* (304).

The second rubric at the beginning of the office permits (the Minister) to go *to the Church or to the grave, i.e.* to either of them directly, which he pleases (416).

When the body is stript of all but its grave attire,* and is just a going to be put into the ground . . . (416).

The ancient Christians used to give a parting kiss of charity, just as the body was about to be put into the grave . . . a custom still retained . . . in some of the Northern parts of England (417).

II.—FROM A CHURCH QUESTION BOX

Late one Saturday evening, quite recently, just before leaving the church, I looked into our question box that stands by the porch. For a long time the box had been empty, but now to my surprise the questions were pouring in thick and fast. They had been placed there, not by a member of the congregation, and were to be answered on two Sunday mornings. I must begin the following morning, which I did. The choir boys were dismissed after the Eucharist, and a homely talk on vital matters to all who cared to remain took the place of the sermon.

What were the questions like? They came from a soul in earnest, one by no means uneducated, in touch with many others at a Teachers' Training College, where the students are always discussing religion, many of them sharing the point of view indicated by the questions. These questions, though not so placed on the papers found in the box, quite naturally group themselves into two clearly marked sections, *theological* and *moral*: I will give them as far as I can in their original wording.

(*a*) *Theological.*—Did the miracles ever really happen? Was not our Lord born as other men? Surely belief in the Virgin Birth is impossible? How is one to know what to believe in the New Testament? Is it not all a glorified story about a very wonderful human being? Is there any truth in the Resurrection narratives? Did Jesus really die on the Cross? Had He not rather gone into a deep faint? or, if there are "appearances" to be accounted for, were they not mere phantasies, the creation of the overwrought disciples in their great longing to see Him again? Is there any life hereafter? Does not life end at death? Is not the idea of life after death a mere sop at which many people grasp eagerly?

(*b*) *Moral.*—What is really our purpose in life? Is not happiness our goal, as it certainly is for the average man and girl? If happiness is to be complete must not there be complete self-expression? Why then oppose divorce? Quarrelling causes unhappiness, and the repression of an unhappy marriage is bad for the individual and hinders his or her full expression. Why does the Church oppose birth control? God does not want us to bring unwanted and illegitimate children into the world, does He?

* Wheatley does not mention coffins.

I need hardly point out how simple a matter it is for a thoughtful teacher, if properly equipped, to deal with such questions, nor the fact that there was *no question with any reference to the Cross*. There were many others; I have only chosen the most important; the significance of them is surely apparent to all. "The legend of the empty tomb," Christ's "mere physical body," "a female and her child," "the impossibility of belief in miracles." We have heard enough of such phrases and know indeed what they are coming to mean. The Archbishops have summoned us to study the Faith afresh; high placed ecclesiastics are steadily denying it and undermining men's belief in it: meanwhile the foundations of Christian morality are being shaken.

Many are sorely puzzled. Many more are only too glad to be told by accredited teachers of the Church of England that the doctrines of the Church are false, from which they draw the terrible conclusion that Christian morality is no longer necessary. A return may be made without scruple to the paganism of the Roman Empire; students of history need not be told what that means.

"The Dark Night of the Church": some think this title expresses an exaggeration. To others of us who are by nature optimists, the gravity of the situation cannot possibly be over-emphasized.

R. D. MIDDLETON.

III.—AN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PARSON AND HIS SUNDAY SCHOOL.

[A relative of the Editor, the Rev. A. B. Selwyn, kindly sends the following "Extract of a Letter from a Clergyman, Rev. Charles Jasper Selwyn of Blockley, residing in the North part of the County of Gloucester," which is contained in an appendix to a sermon preached in the Parish Church of Painswick on September 24, 1786, and afterwards published.—ED.]

"I have thought myself extremely happy to be able to set the Institution on foot: as it promises, under God much future good to this Place. . . . By the assistance of my neighbours and other charitable friends, we have established already as many as five Schools in the Parish, which are as decently and regularly attended, as I suppose they can be anywhere.

"An excellent Lady* in the Parish has had the goodness to build a gallery at her own expense, for the accommodation of the children at Church. We thought it would have been capacious enough to have held all that we should be able to procure to attend the Schools; but their numbers have so increased, that we are obliged to disperse near forty of the Children in other parts of the Church: they have in general shown an eager desire to benefit by the instruction offered them; and though they spend five hours in the day at School, besides their attendance at Church, they all seem pleased with it, and do not repine in the least at their confinement. I would rather mention this circumstance, as knowing that different opinions prevail, with respect to the number of hours that should be employed in this pious work: but whilst the children themselves are so well contented, I think there can be no impropriety in keeping them so usefully engaged, and I can hardly conceive that it would answer the end

* Lady Rushout.

proposed, if fewer hours were employed; or they were left for so many more hours to the hazard of defeating the purposes of the Institution by idleness or improper pursuits. They come to Church every Lord's Day, hand in hand, quietly, decently, and without the least disturbance, and pay every attention that can be expected to the several parts of the Service. They have advanced in their learning, as much as we could reasonably hope, and ever since the Schools were first opened, in February last [? 1786] a fresh set has been catechised in the Church every Sunday. My Curate, or myself, or both of us make it a rule to visit the Schools constantly, to examine the children, and see that everything goes on as it ought to do; and have hitherto, in the course of more than four months, had no cause for complaint."

[It is significant that Robert Raikes and the Rev. Thomas Stock started their Sunday School—practically the pioneer—in a private house in Gloucester, in 1780.]

A. B. SELWYN.

STUDIES IN TEXTS

(1) St. Mark iv. 11, 12 (R.V.).

"*And he said unto them, Unto you is given the mystery of the kingdom of God: but unto them that are without, all things are done in parables: that seeing, they may see, and not perceive; and hearing they may hear, and not understand; lest haply they should turn again, and it should be forgiven them.*"

I have always considered this one of the most difficult passages in the Bible, as it implies (at first sight) that Christ spoke in parables for the express purpose of preventing the people from understanding Him and being saved! Compare the case of the Governor of some district in India where there had been a rebellion, and the king said he would pardon all those who gave up their arms. The Governor then put up in all the villages a notice to this effect; only instead of translating it into the Indian language which the people knew, he translated it into another which they did not know, and said he did it on purpose to prevent the people from giving up their arms, and being pardoned! It would be difficult to find words strong enough to condemn such conduct.

Now, of course, the text does not really mean anything like this; yet this is what it *seems* to mean; and how is it to be explained? Fortunately, the parallel passage in Matt. xiii. 13-15 affords some help, for there is an important variation in the wording: "*Therefore speak I to them in parables; because seeing, they see not, and hearing, they hear not, neither do they understand.*" Here, it will be noticed, the word *because* rather alters the sense. Christ did not speak in parables *in order that* seeing they might see and not perceive, etc., but *because* seeing, they did not see, etc. Moreover, the reference to the prophecy of Isaiah "*And their eyes they have closed*" certainly implies that their not seeing was voluntary—they did not choose to see, they closed their eyes.

The meaning, then, seems to be that in the case of wilful sinners (*them that are without*) Christ would not preach the Gospel plainly *because* though they might see, they would refuse to perceive, and though they might hear, they would refuse to understand, *lest haply* (*i.e.*, for fear that) if they

did perceive and understand, they would have to repent and give up their bad lives, which was just what they did not want to do. They would therefore harden their hearts, and be more determined than ever *not* to repent; so the preaching would do more harm than good. On the other hand, preaching by parables would not offend anyone, and to those who were willingly disposed, and were anxious to amend their lives, it might, and probably would, do some good.

[Is it not probable that the Marcan reading was altered in Matthew because of its difficulty?—ED.].

W. H. TURTON, *Lt.-Col.*

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(2) St. John xxi. 23-25.

The following suggestion came to me while thinking over Streeter's words on the Fourth Gospel, and more especially those of Westcott quoted in Streeter's book—namely, that the last two verses of the Gospel "were probably added by the Ephesian elders, to whom the preceding narrative had been given both *orally* and in writing." My suggestion is that the present verse 25 originally followed verse 23, while verse 24 formed the original conclusion to the Gospel. The scene presented is that of St. John, now an old man and near his end, who has partly written, but more generally dictated, his wonderful work; with the elders of the Ephesian Church and his friends about him, he is having the completed Gospel—ending at v. 23—read over to him, for alteration, emendation, etc. The reading ends, and the old man, possibly half to himself and half aloud, says reflectively, "And there are also many other things which Jesus did the which if they should be written every one, I suppose that even the world itself could not contain the books that should be written."

The elder who has been reading, eager to note every word of the speaker, his beloved master and Bishop, quickly writes down this verse at the end of the Gospel.

This forms, surely, an appropriate conclusion to the Gospel, whether a verse similar to it has occurred before or not, and when the elders published the work they would naturally see no cause for removing it.

Further, the addition of the elders, our present v. 24, though admittedly gratuitous, comes far more naturally after St. John's reflective words than before them—that is, after v. 25 than before it.

There is further support for this theory in that the οὗτος with which v. 24 opens, though it may follow, as it does, upon αὐτόν, the object of the previous sentence, surely follows yet more naturally upon the subject of v. 25. The elders consider that St. John's reflective words upon the many works of Jesus form a fitting conclusion to the Gospel, and add their own note to impress upon the reader that the "I" of v. 25 is indeed St. John himself speaking.

This theory is admittedly no more than a suggestion, as I am unable to support it by MSS., except in so far as the omission of v. 25 by Codex Sinaiticus at least points to the Gospel ending with the elders' note.

LIONEL S. K. FORD.

REVIEWS

South America.

Twenty-Five Years in South America. By Bishop Every. S.P.C.K. 7s. 6d.

A Padre in Paraguay. By Rev. C. E. Newbould. S.P.C.K. 6s.

It has for long been the complaint of those whose evangelistic zeal found expression in interest in South America that that vast territory was the neglected continent; and it would not appear that the issue of the fifth and sixth reports of the World Call have yet done a great deal to increase the interest taken in the work of the Church in that extensive field.

The S.P.C.K., therefore, has done signal service in publishing two books which tell the story of the Church's work in South America, and show not only the romance which attaches to past history, as in the tragic and heroic end of Captain Allen Gardiner, but the adventure of pastoral ministry today.

The more solid of these two books, Bishop Every's *Twenty-Five Years in South America*, does much more than merely tell an interesting story of patient work in a remote land. His special opportunity lies in the fact that his supervision of churches scattered over a vast territory comprising many different states enables him to make a wide survey of the conditions of life. Most of our countrymen who go out to South America go to be engaged in some particular concern which gives them, perhaps, very intimate acquaintance with one locality. Bishop Every takes us through Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Brazil, and the Chaco.

A perusal of these pages gives one increasingly the impression of listening to one who has given to his service that quiet sanity of outlook and devotion to unexciting and unrewarded duty which is so often to be found in the best of our civil servants abroad. He has quietly marked and carefully analyzed the conditions which prevail. He is scrupulously fair, but he does not withhold criticism. He is alive to the peculiar difficulties and dangers which inevitably surround strangers in a foreign land with a civilization at once like and very unlike our own. "Let it be clearly understood," he warns us, "that as commercial groups and individuals settled in South American republics and engaged in special enterprises, we have everything against us—race, tradition, religion, and environment."

These handicaps, real as they are, have not held the British back from very considerable interests in commerce and industry,

and the Bishop clearly indicates that the record of British enterprise in South America is a fine record. But the fact that such difficulties exist, making the life of those who go out to South America necessarily one of a sort of exile in a strange land, however friendly, only increases the responsibility of the Church towards her sons.

It is clear that from not too auspicious beginnings in consular chaplaincies tied by convention, and evangelistic zeal on the part of certain devoted Christians which at the first was irregular and quixotic, there has grown up a work which is deserving of all support and interest. The Bishop tells with obvious sympathy the story of the beginnings of the "Patagonian" mission, and pays due tribute to the long and constructive work which Bishop Stirling did, building up "out of these strangely scattered and varied elements a loyal and united diocese."

In an illuminating chapter the Bishop describes the kind of work which falls to his lot, as unlike the work of a diocesan Bishop at home as may be. It is not less responsible, nor less heavy, but it depends probably even more for success upon personality, initiative, power of endurance, and some love of adventure. And what is true of the Bishop must be true of the chaplains too. Their work no less than his depends upon adaptability, personality, and initiative. The Bishop sighs for the "best men—only they are of any use, and now it seems we cannot get them." Just because the centres of witness are so few it is of the utmost importance that they should be centres of living faith. Just because the work is so difficult in many respects it demands men who will enter into it with zest.

The fact is that the Church has to contend with difficulties not unlike those felt at home, but accentuated in an environment such as a Latin civilization in a tropical country produces; indifference to organized religion rather than any definite hostility marks the attitude of too many of our people abroad, and there is the further difficulty caused by the impermanence of the population in most of the centres.

This situation at once calls for and makes very difficult the extension of the work by the creation of a new diocese, for which the Bishop is eager.

On the side of the purely missionary work there is equally a need for extension, but this also is hardly a practical proposition unless the South American Missionary Society can win a much wider support at home than at present it commands.

In later chapters the Bishop has much to say of magnificent work done by men of this fine fibre in the missions among the Indians of the Paraguayan and Argentine Chaco. Many readers will be already familiar with the name of Barbrooke

Grubb. Hardly less heroic, though less well known, is R. J. Hunt, "the Father and Mother of the Mataco Mission."

Both these men are missionaries of the South American Missionary Society, and their work is known to the supporters of that society.

For a picture of the very varied life of a chaplain we turn to the slighter of the two books under review—*A Padre in Paraguay*, by the Rev. C. E. Newbould.

Mr. Newbould's experiences have indeed been full of excitement, and are told with considerable humour, but there is about the book a certain inconsequence and diffuseness which makes it a little hard to form a clear impression of his work. It is not so much the book to enlighten the student as to arouse the interest of healthy and virile boys. It is full of good stories, behind which one can easily detect the earnestness of the padre.

We commend both these books as calculated to give the reader a strangely fresh and arresting impression of the quiet, patient work that is being done by the Church of England under conditions that are often dangerous, often embarrassing, and never easy, in South America.

J. R. DARBYSHIRE.

DOGMA IN HISTORY AND THOUGHT. Studies by various writers. Nisbet. 8s. 6d.

Dr. Matthews, the editor of this very timely collection of essays, defines dogma, with some qualifications, as "that part of the theological treasure of the Church which has been put forward by authority and has been required as a condition of membership." We are faced at once with a question which seems to lurk in the minds of most of the writers: Is the claim to dogmatize a claim to infallibility? Dr. Matthews himself rejects the term. Yet he says that "any belief in the Holy Spirit would seem to preclude us from holding that the Church has been wholly mistaken." So Dr. Bicknell tells us that the dogmatic statements of the New Testament are not "to be regarded as *a priori* irreformable," yet he holds that, being more akin to moral and artistic than to scientific judgments, they will, in fact, never be superseded. Dr. Gore maintains that there is no such thing as development in dogma. In theology, yes; but in dogma, no. Dogma is the fundamentally unalterable basis of fact on which the theologies are founded. Mr. Hanson's whole position is founded on the idea that Christianity depends on a specific revelation from God which claims precedence over all human logical processes. Finally, Dr. Relton sums up his conclusions thus: "While we lay no claim to an unalterable

creed so far as its form is concerned, we do contend for an unchangeable content." It will be seen that those of the authors who deal with the point are in general agreement that, while there has been a real revelation from the infallible God, infallibility does not attach to the definitions by which the content of the revelation is expressed, but to the faith which expresses itself, provisionally, in those definitions. The creeds, therefore, are theoretically reformable, but only because they may not express themselves as perfectly as could be desired. The question whether any authority now exists which could revise the Catholic formulæ lies outside the writers' scope.

It need not be said that this brilliant galaxy of teachers, associated, with one exception, with the theological faculty of King's College, has produced a book which will receive the attention of all who are interested in dogmatics. It is greatly to be hoped that it will also find an audience among those who are willing to accept some guidance as to the claim of Christian dogma upon their belief. The book as a whole is admirably adapted to give such guidance. In spite of its grim title, it is liberal, persuasive, and eminently readable. The reviewer confesses to having given scandal to a business man from Birmingham by chuckling audibly in the train over an article with the dry-as-dust heading of "Dogma in Mediæval Scholasticism." Certainly Mr. Hanson's article is the *bonne bouche* of the whole collection. The author refuses to be scared out of his admiration for the schoolmen by the bogey of dualism. Certainly, he acknowledges, they maintained a double corpus of knowledge, the *lumen naturale* and the *revelatio Dei*. To them the former meant Aristotle. "The respect of Aquinas for Aristotle is comparable to the respect of the modern theologian for Bergson or Darwin or Hegel, and it would be difficult to put it higher. . . . But when the deliverances of Aristotle appeared to Aquinas to contravene the accepted doctrines of the Christian faith, incredible as such a course may seem to the modern monistically trained mind, Aquinas did not proceed to alter the Christian dogma, he altered Aristotle." Mr. Hanson is not concerned to defend either Aristotelianism or mediæval dogma as such, but he asserts very plainly that the dualism of reason and revelation is a necessary part of Christianity in anything like its traditional form, tracing theological dualism back from the schoolmen through Augustine, Chalcedon, Nicæa, and St. Paul to our Lord Himself. So he comes to the "Christian and Scholastic doctrine" of the self-sufficiency of God and the creaturely dependence of the world. "It is dualistic, it is miraculous, it presents great difficulty to the human reason, and still more to human conceit, for though the modern man

can get on very well without God and can even make it his boast, he finds the conception of a God who can get on very well without him highly offensive."

Dr. Franks writes on the less familiar topic of Protestant scholasticism. He shows how the new doctrine of the schools was founded on the old one, the sole authority of Scripture being substituted for that of the teaching Church. But if it were asked on what authority Scripture itself is to be received, the answer had to be the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti*. Protestant scholasticism, however, proved too heavy a superstructure, and collapsed before the demand for greater simplicity of dogma, a demand simultaneously pressed from the two opposite quarters of Pietism and the Illumination.

Dr. Jenkins' essay on the "Decline of Dogma" stands by itself. It defies analysis, and illustrates rather than describes a period. But it is good reading for the controversialist, and perhaps a wholesome corrective to anyone who may have been deceived by Mr. Hanson's facile rapier strokes into thinking that to cry *touché* is to have won a substantial victory. It is very largely an appeal for an honest endeavour to defend nothing in controversy except what is believed to be finally defensible.

Dr. Relton's contribution, the "Reconstruction of Dogma," represents, no doubt, the ultimate aim of the book. The Christian faith, so the authors hold, demands a re-presentation; and Dr. Relton is deputed to indicate the lines on which it must proceed. Perhaps he is a little too much inclined to fall into the snare of *entweder . . . oder*. In particular, this must be noticed in his "clear issue between two religions, the religion of Jesus the worshipper, and the religion that worships Jesus." For surely Catholic Christianity is both. What is the Divine Sacrifice, whether on Cross or Altar, or at God's right hand, but a perfect act of adoration on the part of the Humanity of Christ? One cannot help wondering whether Dr. Relton's Christology really leads him to deny this. But the essay as a whole is masterly: a triumph of compression, of lucidity, and of selection. The point, as he is not afraid to say, is, What *was* Christianity? It is founded on historical events, and draws its values from them. If the Christian faith is to be rebuilt, it is on the foundation of these facts that it must still stand, with reason and experience as the tests to apply to the traditional interpretation of them.

K. D. MACKENZIE.

NOTICES

A Book of Essays rightly called "The Thing." By G. K. C. Sheed and Ward. 7s. 6d.

As a sincere admirer of Mr. Chesterton, I opened his new book with lively interest, and I was not disappointed. The first page is the only silly thing in *The Thing*. Something, which may conceivably represent a sword, a symbol for which Mr. Chesterton has a great affection, points proudly towards the main title, *The Thing*, and is inscribed with the following legend: "It is not given for goods or gear, but for . . ."

I suppose those whom Mr. Belloc describes as "men of the Catholic culture" will doubtless find it highly illuminating, but it left me puzzled.

As a controversialist, Mr. Chesterton has always been more effective in attack than in defence. He is a brilliant and devastating critic of the loose thinking which masquerades as modern thought, but he is far less convincing in defence.

The romance of Catholicism has, perhaps, found few more able interpreters than Mr. Chesterton, but it is one thing to translate into words the climate and the atmosphere of Catholicism, and quite another thing to discover a convincing line of defence against all possible criticisms of Roman Catholicism. Mr. Chesterton is no exception to the general rule that Roman Catholic apologists never state the case as it is stated by enlightened and well-informed opponents.

It would be easy to quote many examples from *The Thing* which reveal Mr. Chesterton's strength in attack. He registers his usual ration of bull's-eyes aiming at the target of Modern Thought. His essay, "Is Humanism a Religion?" is in his best traditions. One need not be a Roman Catholic to agree with Mr. Chesterton that "humanism cannot be a complete substitute for humanism." One need only to have paid a visit to the Ethical Church. Even a Protestant might feel disposed to concede that the "modern world with its modern movements is living on its Catholic capital. It is using and using up the truths that remain to it of the old treasury of Christendom."

The essay called "The Usual Article" has all the freshness and humour which delighted us in "Heretics and Orthodoxy." By "The Usual Article" Mr. Chesterton means the type of article in which we are assured that the message of Christ was perfectly "simple," that the cure for everything is love, that there is no need for senseless ceremonies, and that all the machinery of dogma and priestcraft is one great bluff on religion. This, says Mr. Chesterton, "is exactly as if somebody were to say about the science of medicine: 'All I ask is Health; what could be simpler than the beautiful gift of Health? Why not be content to enjoy for ever the glow of youth and the fresh enjoyment of being fit? Why study dry and dismal sciences of anatomy and physiology; why enquire about the whereabouts of obscure organs of the human body? Why pedantically distinguish between what is labelled a poison and what is labelled an antidote, when it is so simple to enjoy Health? Why worry with a minute exactitude about the number of drops of laudanum or the strength of a dose of chloral, when it is so nice to be healthy? Away with your priestly apparatus of stethoscopes and clinical thermometers; with your ritualistic mummery of feeling pulses, putting out tongues, examining teeth, and the rest! The god Æsculapius came on earth solely to inform us that

Life is on the whole preferable to Death; and this thought will console many dying persons unattended by doctors.'"

It is the privilege of genius to be the first to enunciate a truism. A platitude is merely a truism which is repeated until it is wearisomely familiar. "It is not self-evident," says Mr. Chesterton, "that ignorance is the goal of knowledge." A platitude? No, hardly; a truism which many scientists have yet to discover. "The general notion that science establishes agnosticism is a sort of mystification produced by talking Latin and Greek instead of plain English. Science is the Latin for knowledge, Agnosticism is Greek for ignorance. It is not self-evident that ignorance is the goal of knowledge."

These few samples of the many excellent things of which *The Thing* is full will, I hope, send all readers of this review to the book itself. I hope I shall not be considered ungracious if I conclude by voicing a certain sense of disappointment.

I have, of course, no quarrel with the book because it contains a few blatant mistakes on points of fact. The honest critic must confess a certain pleasure in catching out the great in a first-class blunder. Mr. Chesterton, for instance, challenges Dean Inge to name the encyclical or decree which declares that "the Roman Church has declared that there can be no reconciliation between Rome and modern liberalism or progress." I am writing away from books, but I am pretty certain that these words are a translation of a declaration in the encyclical *Quanta Curæ*.

My real quarrel with Mr. Chesterton is not that he makes an occasional mistake, but that he is far too easily pleased. He is content to slay the slain with great gusto, but he does not seek battle with those who are worthy of his steel. Among the readers of his book there must be some who do not believe that licences to sin under the name of Indulgences are sold across the counter in Rome, or that the Roman Catholic Church condemns Protestants who die in good faith to Eternal Punishment. Surely Mr. Chesterton might pay his readers the compliment of concentrating on those difficulties which prevent men sympathetic to Catholicism from following Mr. Chesterton on the path to Rome.

Roman Catholics, unfortunately, are only too ready to concentrate on the second-best rather than on the best case against their Church. Walk into any Roman Catholic Church, and you will be able to buy, for a penny, pamphlets which profess to deal with these difficulties. You will, however, never find in a pamphlet on Indulgences, or Hell, or Infallibility the strongest case against Rome, but only the arguments put forth by unintelligent critics.

Mr. Chesterton's controversial skill is wasted on his attempts to explain why he prefers Roman Catholicism to Christian Science, New Thought, or the Ethical Church. If these were the only alternatives, we, too, should make a similar choice. But neither in this book nor in any other book that Mr. Chesterton has written can we begin to discover his own answer to the difficulties which prevented, say, Father Wilfred Knox from following Father Ronald Knox into the Church of Rome.

ARNOLD LUNN.

MAGIC AND GRACE. By Lindsay Dewar, B.D. S.P.C.K. 6s.

This book should take its place at once among the most considerable and important of those which make use of various concepts, familiar to

students of modern psychology, to describe and to vindicate Christian experience and convictions. Mr. Dewar's main thesis is that suggestion (defined as the application of stimulus to instinct) is at work in both magic and religion. In magic, the suggestion is of the kind with which we are familiar in the relation of a herd to its leader and that of a hypnotized patient to his physician: it consists primarily in the stimulation of the instinct of submission, and its differentiating features are the control and authority exercised by a dominant personality, and a greater or less dissociation of the mind of the subject. It is evident that this hypnotic theory of the origin and function of magic is extremely novel: it diverges widely from the principal current views as to the nature of magic and its relations with religion: it can only be fairly appraised by competent anthropologists. Religion, in Mr. Dewar's view, is a phenomenon *sui generis*: its distinguishing characteristic is adoration: it is the result of the application to the religious instinct (peculiar, like laughter, to man among the animals) of a specific stimulus, defined generally as Grace, and identified with Otto's *mysterium tremendum et fascinans*. Mr. Dewar, it will be seen, does not lack courage. Having *épaté* the anthropologists with his heretical notions of magic, he turns to the psychologists to talk about the "religious instinct"! Not many of them, we think, will be converted. The difficulties are greater, perhaps, than the author allows, and on non-psychological grounds there seems less danger of departmentalizing religion (and the workings of God in human hearts) if we think of it as a "sentiment," necessarily integrating all the fundamental activities of the mind, rather than as one "instinct" among others. But these and other positions are worked out with care and with a wealth of application which enable Mr. Dewar to treat many familiar topics in an exceptionally original and illuminating way: we may refer, for example, to the discussions of many of the incidents in our Lord's Ministry, the events of the Day of Pentecost, the conversion of St. Paul, and the genesis of the Apostle's peculiar doctrine of Grace. We hope the book will have the circulation which the immense amount of thought and reading that have gone to the making of it deserves.

C. E. HUDSON.

THE EPISTLE TO THE EPHESIANS. By W. Lock, D.D. Westminster Commentaries. Methuen. 6s.

Dr. Lock in his preface says that he has been especially struck by two points about the Epistle—"the political tone of it" and "the Roman stamp upon the whole." His commentary will help readers to appreciate both of these points. Although one of the most theological of the Pauline epistles, "Ephesians" drives home the broad lines of its meaning by the sheer force of its poetic onrush, in which all the great Pauline terms (especially "unity" and "fulness") conspire to strengthen one another, and thus there are few difficulties of strictly theological interpretation such as are presented by an epistle like "Romans." What the Epistle demands primarily of its commentator is delicate insight into the overflowing richness of its writer's mind and its exalted expression. Dr. Lock, as we should expect, fully responds to this demand, and draws out the meaning of the Epistle, with full but discriminating references to the Scriptures and to ancient and modern authors. Among such references, those to early English translations of the Epistle are a particularly pleasing feature.

The two extracts added from the author's earlier work, *St. Paul, the Master Builder*, are valuable expositions of St. Paul's teaching on the unity of Jew and Gentile, and of his use of the word "Ecclesia." We should have liked to hear Dr. Lock's view of the theory that the injunctions in v. 22 *f.* are based on current *Haustafeln*.

In accordance with the plan of the series, the introduction to the commentary is brief. Of the authorship it is concluded that "if not by St. Paul, it is by a disciple so steeped in his teaching and writing that it is a true expression of his mind and equally authoritative, but it is far more probable that it is his own work." The argument from style is justly judged to be quite inconclusive. Such an argument is always difficult to state in a way which takes all factors into account, and is particularly precarious when used in connection with a man of St. Paul's temperament.

This commentary, with its combination of discriminating learning and expository power, should be warmly welcomed by those whose needs the Westminster Commentaries seek to supply.

H. J. CARPENTER.

THE RELIGIOUS QUESTS OF THE GRÆCO-ROMAN WORLD. By S. Angus, D.D. Murray. 15s.

This book is a study (or a collection of studies) in the historical background of early Christianity. In some parts its range extends back to the fourth century B.C. and forward to the fifth century A.D.—a width of range perhaps unavoidable, for the religion of the Hellenistic and early Christian period, with its bewildering syncretism and intricate cross-currents, is easier to comprehend and describe in its broad lines extending over several centuries than it is in its detailed growth.

So far as the non-Christian religion of the period is concerned, the book achieves success. There is no such modern and comprehensive survey available for the student in English, and the author has a gift for vivid phrase and apt quotation with the necessary learning and sympathetic insight into the religious aspirations he describes. His accounts of Astralism and of the religion of the Hermetic literature are particularly valuable.

Early Christianity, however, emerges less happily from the author's treatment. The impression he gives of its history in contact with paganism is that of a "decline and fall" from the ideals of its Founder. In discussing the attitude of Christianity towards Hellenic culture, he regrets that "intolerance and legalism," so contrary to the "comprehensiveness of Christ," finally prevailed in the Western Church, to the exclusion of earlier and more liberal traditions based on Hellenism, and that Christianity made no effort to save Græco-Roman culture from collapse; but he fails to notice the compensating fact that the Western Church preserved Roman law and order for a Europe overrun by raw barbarians. Again, if Neo-Platonism represented all that was best in Greek philosophy and religion of the period, it was absorbed into Christian thought, even in the West, by men like Augustine, and was still operative when the new creative period began in the early Middle Ages.

The long central section (nearly one-third of the book) on "The Religion of Magic, Sacrament, and Symbol," might have been more appropriately called "Christianity and Sacraments," for Dr. Angus here describes not only how he believes pagan "sacramentarianism" to have

entered early Christianity, but also his view of the true nature of Christian sacramentalism. The "materialistic and magical sacramentarianism" which developed in patristic Christianity was (he believes) quite foreign to the "immediacy" of the religion of Jesus. St. Paul's "symbolic-mystic" views of the sacraments "easily declined into magical or semi-physical operations." In the fourth Gospel there is at once increased emphasis on the sacraments and attempts to spiritualize their significance. After this, the "materialization" of the sacraments progressed rapidly, and this was due not so much to any direct influence of the Mystery Religions as to the whole ancient "realistic" mentality, which is well characterized on pp. 132-145.

That patristic sacramental teaching suffered in some degree from the influence of pagan sub-sacramental ideas cannot be denied; such phrases as "the drug of immortality" and the related ideas strike us as crude and perilously near the magical. Dr. Angus has brought out only this aspect of patristic sacramentalism, and thus draws a partial picture. The truth is that Christian sacramentalism can be justly estimated only in its intimate relation with its liturgical and theological context. Can a rite celebrated in the setting of any of the early liturgies with their exalted prayer and praise be justly estimated as magical? But Dr. Angus disagrees with the patristic, and indeed Catholic, theological outlook as a whole. He regards patristic emphasis on the unique Incarnation of the Divine in Jesus and on doctrines like the resurrection of the body as unfortunate, even if at the time necessary. Though he allows great value to the Christian sacramental rites, he will not allow that any unique grace is divinely attached to them. For the apprehension of a diffused sacramentalism in all things he argues well, but he will not admit the fundamental Catholic principle that God's purpose works in history by the selection of particular persons and things for unique tasks. Bearing this in mind, even the Catholic reader will find much that is enlightening in Dr. Angus's learned study.

H. J. CARPENTER.

FELLOWSHIP PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE. By a Fellowship Group. Edited by Malcolm Spencer and H. S. Hewish. Allen and Unwin. 7s. 6d.

This might have been a very useful book. We have heard a good deal about the Group Mind, Herd Instinct, and so on, and a book written from inside by a self-conscious group, showing how the plus quantity of the group over the mere collection of individuals could be utilized in the service of the Christian Society, would have been valuable. Such hopes are not fulfilled. The apparent function of a group is to discuss. The book is all taken up with beautiful flowing generalizations on "principles," in which the reader vainly seeks for any concrete examples of "practice." We are asked to "imagine a concerted effort to enlist the interest of all Christian people in . . . the establishment of a decent standard of life for all classes of the community," apparently by yet more organized discussion. It would have been more helpful to have seen a group dealing with, say, clearing a slum. It is difficult to see for whom the book is intended. We are never shown a group at work, and a great part of the conclusions with which we are presented, such as "that leadership is necessary" (after twenty pages of generalizations), seem to have been reached before.

M. D. R. WILLINK.

THE AUTHORITY OF CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE. By R. H. Strachan, D.D. S.C.M. 7s. 6d.

This is a rather tantalizing book. Dr. Strachan writes interestingly about a large number of the profoundest problems in the philosophy of religion, and brings to their consideration a good store of reading and an alert mind. But in less than 250 pages a writer cannot range so widely without leaving the reader, like Æneas before Dido, "wishing to say many things" and regretting that his author should abandon one subject for the next just at that particular point in the discussion. On several grave matters the treatment is decidedly thin.

The main subject of the book is the problem of authority in religion; and Dr. Strachan finds the solution in individual religious experience, regarding other channels of authority, such as logical argument, the Church, and the Bible, as always subordinate to the personal experience of the believer. In our view, this thesis needs a good deal more support than Dr. Strachan provides to make it acceptable. He never really comes to grips with the central problem of religious authority, which is to co-ordinate the claims of the various *media* through which the unquestioned authority of God in Christ is conveyed to us. He admits the existence of other *media* than our personal apprehension of God. He acknowledges our debt to "great prophetic personalities," and he has a strong sense of the necessity and authority of the Church in its continuous life. He realizes, too, that the individual's experience is never isolated, but is moulded by social environment and tradition. Yet he does not appear to us to have any clear and precise conception of the problems started by these admissions. It helps very little to insist, after every such admission, that nevertheless private judgment and personal experience are always supreme. Since everything that enters my experience is experienced by me, we can, if we like, affirm that in that sense private judgment is necessarily the ultimate authority. But it is not a very illuminating conclusion. More to the point would be an attempt to answer the very difficult question of the balance between the various *media* of authority, where the individual finds, as he commonly does, that his own very limited knowledge and insight (to say nothing of his sin and frivolity) fail to assure him of what the Christ of the Gospels, the voice of the saints, and the common mind of the Church proclaim as true and valuable.

The book is valuable as suggesting lines of thought, but it attempts too much in its brief compass to make any very serious contribution to the philosophy of religion.

H. BALMFORTH.

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